


TWENTY-FIRST YEAR

THE PERSONALIST



WINTER 1940

ONE VIEW OF THEISM	The Editor
PHILOSOPHY AS A SCIENCE	Thomas Greenwood
PROFESSOR MACINTOSH AND EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY	Randolph Crump Miller
PERSONALISM AND CATHOLIC THEOLOGY	Jared S. Moore
THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF CHINESE PAINTING	Yu-Shan Han
THE PHILOSOPHY OF POETRY	William Hester

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OUR CONTRIBUTORS' PAGE

The **Editor's** thought turns again to the persistent problem of God. From earliest times, ideas of God have undergone transformations. At present former theological conceptions are crumbling before the attack of the notion of a God working under limitations. *One View of Theism* is a clear, modern statement of the problem.

Dr. Thomas Greenwood, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, makes plain and wholesome reconciliation between philosophy and science in *Philosophy as a Science*. Professor Greenwood at present is detained in America on account of the war.

Professor Macintosh has made himself notable for various reasons but none, probably, more lasting than his attempt to introduce empiricism into religion. **Randolph Crump Miller**, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Church Divinity School of the Pacific, Berkeley, California, presents a clear and sympathetic study of this subject in *Professor Macintosh and Empirical Theology*.

In the Summer, 1939, issue of *The Personalist*, Albert C. Knudson contributed *Personalism and Theology*. **Jared Sparks Moore**, Professor of Philosophy, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, replies with supplementary additions to Professor Knudson's article under the title *Personalism and Catholic Theology*.

Dr. Yu-Shan Han, St. John's University, Shanghai, China, writes of *The Philosophic Background of Chinese Painting* with an unusual degree of knowledge and appreciation. Dr. Han is the author of many works in Chinese and a lecturer of note. He here makes a genuine contribution toward the enlarging general interest in Oriental culture.

The Philosophy of Poetry will be of special interest to all lovers of literature and philosophy. Its author, **William Hester**, writes from Atlanta, Georgia.

THE PERSONALIST



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RELIGION AND
LITERATURE



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
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LANTERN OF DIOGENES



¶ In certain major industries the principal income is produced from the by-products.

¶ This fact has analogy and application in many places in this world of relationship so intricate that disharmony at one point affects the whole situation.

¶ Many values yield nothing to direct search and are to be had only as by-products

¶ Whoever set out to be happy and therein succeeded? The pursuit of happiness is an unquenched thirst. Yet if one will cease seeking and go about his work of duty and love and unselfishness, he finds happiness has moved in and taken up its abode with him.

¶ In similar fashion, fame has a way of ducking its pursuer. It is true he may get his name and picture in the daily paper, but in the end he achieves only a notoriety which makes him the quip of every jest.

¶ Let him but turn wholeheartedly and without thought of renown to his task and the world begins beating a path to his door.

¶ Let him no longer yearn, but turn his back upon it and society will rattle at his casement to get in.

¶ Violence in behalf of peace is in a like category. An imposed peace is impossible. Its ground is faith among men. Faith will establish love. We cannot but love him who keeps his word. Where there is faith and love there will be peace. The want of faith is perdition.

R. T. F.

The Personalist

ONE VIEW OF THEISM

By THE EDITOR

THEISM is as old as philosophy and almost as varied in its concepts. We shall assume that our readers are not primarily interested in the history of theism, nor in its fifty-seven varieties. It may be excusable then not to go back to Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Boethius, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Schleiermacher and Emerson to give their accounts of theism. May we not rather cut the Gordian knot of our perplexity by writing about some late developments of theism and in particular, in shameless disregard of other definitions of theism which are discussed at length in such works as Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, to treat of the writer's own view of theism.

In the work just mentioned Professor A. E. Taylor defines theism as:

The doctrine that the ultimate ground of things is a simple supreme reality which is the source of everything other than itself and has characters of being (a) intrinsically complete or perfect and (b) as a consequence, an adequate object of unqualified adoration or worship.¹

He then adds a phrase with which we would take issue, that theism is incompatible with a doctrine of a limited God or a plurality of reals. In spite of the hardihood of disagreement with so able an exponent the suggestion may be forgiven that there may have been some development of definition in the twenty years or so since those words were written, and the claim that in going a step farther we are

¹ Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, "Theism," Volume XII, p. 261.

not going outside the bounds of what may be legitimately described as theism.

As the term theism is here used, it differs from fundamentalism in its concept of a living immanent God as contrasted with the fundamentalistic idea of an Absolute, static, and absentee God and a universe sharply divided into natural as against supernatural, mutually exclusive and antagonistic.

The difference between this kind of theism and naturalism, with which it is sometimes confused, lies in the recognition by theism of the causal efficiency of spiritual forces in the Cosmic Order.

The difference between theism and the pantheism with which it is sometimes charged is that while, like pantheism, it holds to the Divine immanence it also asserts the Divine transcendence and points out that these seemingly opposed principles find a meeting-place in all personality, human or Divine, thus establishing the claim for a personal God.

The difference between theism and deism lies perhaps in the fact that it considers immanence and transcendence not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. Deism has so stressed the transcendent nature of God as to erect Him into an Absolute, shut out of His own creation and incapable of re-entering it under the terms of natural law. The main philosophical difference between deism and fundamentalism, which are often thought to be at opposite poles, lies in the belief of deism that the absentee God does not break into nature while the fundamentalist believes he does, by means of miracles. The theist, on the other hand, looks upon God as the continuously creative source of nature and of natural law.

There can be no doubt that these definitions are too brief to be satisfactory but they may serve to clarify further discussion.

I

The Basic Concept of Theism—Reality as an Activity

To theism all reality is primarily an activity. Theologically this was expressed in Jewish prophetic literature in the phrase "the living God" and confirmed by the teaching of Jesus that "God is the God of the living and not of the dead." Religiously it was expressed by Emerson in the famous Divinity School Address in the words: "God speaketh, not spake," meaning of course that while God did speak in the past He continues to speak. Philosophically and metaphysically some basis for it is to be found in Heracleitus' definition of reality as change and it is expanded in the philosophy of Henri Bergson and modern Personalists.

a) The doctrine of reality as activity is receiving multiplied attention and interest as a fertile concept in our own day. This is notably true in the field of physics. The materialism of a century and a half which regarded reality primarily as lumpishness, inert substance, solely weight and mass, reached its climax at the turn of the present century. Since then many leaders in the world of science have definitely turned their backs on materialistic and mechanistic explanation. The fog persists of course in some belated quarters where scientists have been incapable of changing their ideas or philosophers have been unable or unwilling to think their way through to new concepts. Many of them are as outmoded as the stagecoach but they do not know it.

The latest investigations in the atom show that under the present state of knowledge it can best be treated conceptually as the substanceless center of intense activities. It is now believed that the whole impression of mass and extension is one that we arrive at because of these activities. Even the deadest and most inert stone is looked upon theoretically as a center of activity. Materialism is now seen

chiefly as a hangover from the worst features of Medieval absolutism, the demand for absolute Gods, or Truths, or Substance.

Whatever may be the future of scientific concepts, science finds at least one philosophy already on the ground provided with the essential philosophical postulates to deal with its latest concepts. That philosophy is Personalism. In the basic concept of theism that reality is an activity it is possible for science, philosophy, and religion to find the basis of common understanding, a condition which has not obtained for generations.

b) The theist starting from this definition of reality as active draws from it certain metaphysical conclusions that are potent alike for philosophy and religion. Presuming that all reality is a continuous activity and that this activity shows an orderly correlation working toward ends that do not appear in the beginning and are not physically present, the theist feels warranted in assuming that there is orderliness and design in whatever causal agency is at work producing this activity. Furthermore, as a scientist and as a philosopher, he must trust the human interpretation of the physical world. If his impressions are true and meaningful then the physical world is intelligible to him and whatever it may be causally it must be something that responds and corresponds to his intelligence. The only alternative is to deny the reality of everything including himself. If this continuously active somewhat is both orderly and intelligent or even intelligible he has the philosophical basis for identifying the world-ground as a supreme creative Intelligence, or God. He is as surely justified in the concept of such a world-ground and even more so than the physicist is in assuming the reality of the atom as a center of correlated forces.

To the theist, creation becomes then a living process of

reality. He looks upon the creation of the world not as something that happened in the year four thousand and four B. C. on September 14th at nine-o'clock in the morning, but as something which is going on now as truly as at any time in history. We do not have to figure back to creation, for creation is new every morning and renewed every evening. Furthermore, under this aspect creation and history may be augmented and culminated in something vaster than before. It is not a mere treadmill in which everything that is going to be is considered potentially present. The theist cultivates an optimism that saddens the materialist and increases his contempt. But the long roll of history has shown that both intelligence and progress have been on the side of the optimist. Under this concept of reality the dead past may safely be left to bury its dead, for whatever is of moment finds itself caught up into and taking a part in that living process which we call reality, and which is eternal.

II

Objections

Wisdom may now lie in the consideration of a few of the objections sure to have arisen in the mind of the reader. These objections come from every quarter and only a few can be considered within the limits of this paper. We shall try to consider those that may be deemed most cogent.

Let us begin with the theological objections that are most likely to be urged against our view.

a) The first of these is the one quoted from Professor Taylor in the beginning of this paper. A continuously acting God seems to cancel out the absoluteness of the Divine Perfection. It is perhaps the weakness of mortal minds to demand absolutes. Our minds require the perfect goal, the complete good, the faultless line, the indivisible point. We must believe in and aim at these not only for the sake of

moral and scientific integrity, but also to achieve our imperfect best. However, our Absolute always shows the marks of our own limitations and is only our best opinion. The finite cannot comprehend the infinite. We want an unchanging and unchangeable God, an absolute truth, the same yesterday, today and forever. But when we name these absolutes as attributes of the Divine Person that does not imply that they bear an intelligible meaning. They are rather the expression of our human ignorance and limitation. What we mean to say is that God is vaster in wisdom and power than anything we can conceive. This is our heritage from Platonism and has ruled everywhere in our thought even in the dogmatisms of science which has demanded indivisible points, and atoms and infinities without number. We overlook the fact that so far as we are concerned all these absolutes are to us incomprehensibles. They are words the meaning of which we cannot compass and for that reason they seem all the more esoteric and valuable. They are valuable and one could wish to deal with them at greater length. As Professor Shotwell suggests in his *History of History*:

The mysterious efficiency of numbers is as wide as savagery; the secret value of words is a doctrine as universal as speech.²

Which statement may apply not only to the theological literalist but equally well to the new so-called scientific school of logic. What we need to ask ourselves at the present moment is whether the addition of incomprehensible concepts is valuable to increased and practical understandings.

Is for instance, the view of God as absolute, as completed, necessary to a doctrine of Divine perfection? Is the only perfect flower a dead flower? Or is one in the living process of change quite as perfect? Which is more perfect,

² James T. Shotwell, *The History of History* (Columbia University Press, New York), Volume I, p. 34.

the living or the dead, the growing or the static? May not the concept of Divine perfection demand life and change in the sense of living experience? That certainly is the most perfect human mind and will which can hold a general sense of direction, entertain a foreseen purpose and with it grow to sublimer realization and increased experience. Only a God thought of on those lines could have any conceivable interest and part in the moral struggles and triumphs of men, able to suffer with their sufferings and finding the culminations of his hopes in their moral achievements. Theology may need to think up some more Divine attributes. Incompleteness is not a mark of imperfection in the living. Perfection is rather to be found in the intent, the purpose to which a person commits himself. This purpose is the eternal thing about either God or man but it is subject to a growing content of meaning and experience which is life. What could otherwise be the intent of the commandment: "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in Heaven is perfect." This should meet our demand for the absolute, if we believe in a living God.

b) Some will complain that a theism of this type removes from religion the supernatural and so reduces us to the baseness of materialism and the beast. This is not an objection to be lightly turned down. The trouble is that this objection is based on a belated Manicheism or Zoroastrian dualism which in its enthusiasm for righteousness against wickedness gathered the whole world of nature into the basket of iniquity and raised for itself a doubt of the goodness of a God who could create such a world. Much modern theology is still obsessed with this misreading of reality. Those who rest under the shadow of such concepts will certainly be irked if one points out the existence of any good in the world. To all such, one must needs offer his sympathy, for goodness seems to be only a quality of heaven

and an after-life. The theist on the other hand broadens his conception of the supernatural. He believes not in fewer but in more miracles, if by miracle is meant a living relation between the event and the Divine will. The ongoing of his own life is seen by him as a miracle if by that you mean an expression of the Divine Creative Will. In miracle as the breaking of natural law by a foreign and absentee God, he does not believe. Natural law is to him as miraculous as any other expression of the Divine Will for it is God's creative act. To discover the laws of nature is to discover God. "In him we live and move and have our being"—to take a line from the Greek poet which was adopted by Paul as an expression of Christian truth. Or as one of our own poets, the late Frederic Lawrence Knowles, wrote:

In buds upon some Aaron's rod
The childlike ancient saw his God;
Less credulous, more believing, we
Read in the grass—Divinity.³

c) My agnostic friends will urge against this type of theism the same objection they urge against all belief in God, namely, the problem of Evil. One can scarcely hope in ten minutes to solve the problem for whose answer "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now." The theist looks upon the solution of the problem of evil as the ultimate task of life, of the cosmic order, the task at which God works and calls for our co-operation. One can stay only to make two suggestions which may be worthy of attention and which one may leave to your maturer consideration. The atheist covers himself with an atmosphere of gloom, thrusting on God responsibility for all the pain, suffering and evil created by the wilful wickedness of man, the result both of his shortcoming and ignorance and asks: "How could a good God have

³ Frederic Lawrence Knowles, "The Larger View," *Love Triumphant* (Little, Brown and Company, Boston).

created such a world?" He does not see that it is equally difficult for him to account for the goodness, happiness, health, righteousness and beauty of life. There must be something of a higher and spiritual nature in whatever unthinking demi-urge of his conception is responsible for the universe. Goodness, truth and righteousness are facts. They are the great realities, the things by which we live.

The other question which should be borne in mind is this. If moral and spiritual values are to be the climax of Divine creativity how can they be created apart from the will of moral beings and how can the will to goodness be affirmed except by the possibility of wrong moral choices. It may be assumed that evil is a frightful price to pay for freedom but it must be considered worth the price. To think otherwise is to deny the reality of moral values and to reduce to meaningless sound and fury the problem of life.

d) A final objection which we have to consider clusters about the claim for a personal God. This objection will come from opposing sides. To a fundamentalist who desires to hold a curious notion of a God with body and parts, dwelling in some far off place, the theistic concept of a personal God will not seem personal enough. To the naturalistic thinker the concept of a God as personal can be realized only after the crude manner of the fundamentalist. The theist defines personality as a center of self-consciousness and self-activity. Naturally in our time-space order we expect to find personalities in the time-space clothing of human bodies. But the theist does not believe in taking the appearance for the substance. He perceives that the reality of friendship consists not so much in bodily presence as in qualities of kindness, aspiration, love, loyalty. These are what he most prizes as reality in his friend. Hence he can conceive of an order in which the time-space envelope of a physical body may not be essential even as Plato did so

many centuries ago. So he conceives of God as possessing primarily qualities of self-consciousness and self-direction without the possession of a physical body. This intelligent creative Force, *Elan*, World-Ground or God is conceived as intelligent and purposive since otherwise it would be inadequate to create a world of intelligence and purpose. The character of such a World-Ground can best be described by the term personal.

III

Advantages of This Type of Theism

1. This type of theism ameliorates and would solve the conflict between Religion, Science, and Philosophy.

Each of these disciplines is held to be a valid way of reaching reality. They are complementary and not mutually exclusive. Science is looked upon as gathering such knowledge of the external, space-time world as yield to space-time measurements. In its field it is held as supreme, though its theories must never be assumed as facts. Hypotheses here are no better than the facts warrant and when the facts come the hypothesis dies away, as surely as in the religious realm faith becomes sight.

In the field of philosophy we try to achieve a rational world showing the reasonable relations under which reality expresses itself. Here we discover realities of a rational character.

When we come to values, such as justice, love, truth, righteousness and the practical measures best fitted to produce and perpetuate such qualities we are in the realm of religion. No truth of religion can abrogate a truth of science. Neither is any truth of science competent to deny any real truth of religion. The state of a pointer reading in a lie-detector, for instance, cannot be held to prove the non-existence of truth as a value.

2. This type of theism places religious emphasis on the conduct of life. The proof of religion becomes pragmatic. It does not reside primarily in form, ceremony, creed, tradition, authority or revelation as that term is customarily used. The value of all these is established by their works in bringing righteousness, truth, justice, brotherly love, unselfishness into the personal life and the social order. If they do not achieve this their forms, ceremonies, creeds, traditions and revelations are held to be false.

3. This type of theism provides for the recognition of values in all religion.

It begins by acknowledging that all goodness, self-sacrifice, love, ethical achievement is a manifestation and revelation of the indwelling God. Wherever these appear there is evidence of the presence of the divine. God is presumed not to have left himself without a witness among any people. Any striving after goodness, purity, a higher way of life is a manifestation of the spirit of God in the heart of man. Religion is then seen as universal rather than parochial, national or ethnical. The greater its own inner faith, the more will it seek honest comparison with others, the more eager to learn their good points. "Love thinketh no evil." Herein lies the possibility for the greatest religious advance since the world began. When Christianity begins to think of itself not as an exclusive but as a universal religion, the day of its greatest power will arrive.

4. This type of theism gives place for that important factor and element in all religion, the intuitive and mystical. If all reality is due to a continuous divine activity it must be held possible for receptive souls acting in unison with the Divine Will to be recipients of divine understanding and power.

Such is the type of theism which we believe will exert a growing influence in the world of human realities.

PHILOSOPHY AS A SCIENCE

By THOMAS GREENWOOD

PHILOSOPHY is a science. This is neither a paradox nor a wager; but a deliberate conviction based on two fundamental arguments: the actual business of philosophy and science, and the historical development of knowledge.

It is this conviction which I should like to justify for *The Personalist*, as a modest contribution to its twentieth anniversary.¹ I consider it an honor to be allowed to do so on this memorable occasion; for I appreciate fully the high ideals which have inspired *The Personalist* since its foundation, and continue to bring notable additions to the common pool of human values.

There does not seem to be much agreement, even among philosophers, about the aims of philosophy and its relation to science. Many insist on the speculative character of philosophy, and oppose it to science considered as a positive investigation of facts. For them, science is associated with knowledge acquired by experimental methods, though science itself has never prescribed exclusive methods of research but has insisted only on the application of certain criteria of validity to what is asserted to be known. Philosophy on the other hand, concerns itself with the wisdom attainable by reflection mainly, though speculation is also a method of science. This factual difference it is claimed, makes philosophy and science independent of one another, and even difficult to reconcile without a special effort.

This attitude and the abstruse disquisitions of philosophers holding such views, are responsible for the popular belief that philosophy somehow deals with a world of shadows, with no contact with present conditions; that it develops in a fantastic realm created by the unbridled imagination of man; that it seems to compel its disciples to go

¹ Unfortunately held over from previous issue [Ed.].

about in shabby attire, with their hair wildly uncut, caring little about the amenities of life, and always uttering things too simple and too profound not to sound weird.

These same reasons helped to bring about a reaction which followed the lines of Hume's scepticism, of Kant's agnosticism, and of the positivism and the materialism of the nineteenth century. Contemporary logical empiricism which is the natural outcome of these movements, goes so far as to throw overboard the whole body of values which have so far justified philosophers in undertaking their arduous journey across the stormy seas of the mental sciences. Thus the major branches of philosophy are made to melt down to logic alone: metaphysics is bundled out into the expanse where lyrical verse already occupies a place of honor, while psychology is forced to find refuge with the empirical sciences. Many go even so far as to consider logic as being simply the critical analysis of general assumptions. If such views spread widely enough, we can well predict the day when the governing bodies of the universities would accept the situation and pass resolutions for the abolition of the departments of philosophy proper. It is comforting to think that logicians may be the only survivors of this catastrophe. But nobody would have time then to listen to them: mankind would be merrily making for a brave new world.

Obviously these conceptions of philosophy are narrow as well as misleading. Philosophy is neither speculative, nor positive, nor critical exclusively. As the embodiment of the universal principles of knowledge, it manifests these three characteristics equally. In fact, philosophy may be considered broadly as an attempt to obtain a comprehensive and systematic view of the universe and of life. Though it is not concerned primarily with the immediate and practical purposes of everyday life, it deals with the meaning of the events of the world and of our lives in the form of thoughts.

Philosophy has to do, therefore, with real things as such, and not with abstractions.

A good example of the reality of the subject-matter of philosophy is afforded by the present conditions of the world, where men suffer misery, discomfort, bodily and mental torture, and even death, because of their philosophy of life. The methods of coercion used by some intolerant nations have not been devised in defense of any scientific beliefs, but for crushing those minds which dare to confess a philosophy of life based on individual self-expression.

It is therefore idle to think of a philosopher as a blind man searching in a dark room for a black hat that is not there. The statesman and the lawyer, the physician and the engineer, the artist and the divine may now look to a philosopher for something more than casual remarks about the great problems pervading their particular interests. For whatever be the objects of the special sciences, they always encroach upon philosophy, which alone provides a universal method of approach to every problem of science or life.

Many would agree with these considerations. Yet, they may not see how they can lead to the view that philosophy is a science. The requirements of a science as such are: (a) positive facts as its given material; (b) some kind of experimentation to establish particular and general connections between the facts; (c) impersonal and unprejudiced statements about these facts.

But these characteristics commonly ascribed to science are in fact shared by philosophy as well. The consideration of facts is as necessary to philosophy as it is to science. There can be no philosophy without the acknowledgment and the analysis of facts. If the division of labor had encouraged independent inquiries in the various regions of natural events, it must be admitted that all thinking begins with something that is given. Yet, any event considered in-

dependently is not necessarily a scientific fact. It is just a fact which can be acknowledged as such by any one who is made aware of it. The reflection of a ray of light, the ignition of a match, inoculation with a serum, feelings of pleasure, or mystical experiences, are just facts. They become scientific when they are embodied in a system which connects them with other facts, and which accounts for these connections.

A scientific fact, however, belongs as much to philosophy as to the special science which makes it its business to investigate it to the exclusion of other types of fact. For there is no reason to set absolute limits to the integration of a fact into any specific group of explanatory or descriptive laws. Though it may be expedient to be satisfied with some immediate account of a fact, or at least for an explanation within a system referring to facts of a certain type exclusively, nevertheless, the business of the mind is to correlate any fact and any direct or indirect statement about it with the universe of our activity.

It may be argued that unless certain limits are set to the generalization of an explanation, there is a risk of letting our imagination carry us beyond the significance and possible antecedents and consequences of a given fact. But there is no reason why the same cautious rules followed in a first generalization should not be applicable to the next and more comprehensive stage of generalization. Errors may or may not be avoided in the restricted as well as in the wider generalization of an event. The history of science bears witness to the accuracy of this view.

With regard to experimentation, there is nothing to prevent philosophy from using this method as part of its technique. If philosophy is based on facts, it is free to choose such means as may be necessary for its analysis of facts. Owing to the present organization of intellectual life,

philosophers need not use experimentation necessarily: in most cases, it is enough for them to take advantage of what has been done by specialists. But if there were no men who devote their lives to the systematic performance of experiments and observations, philosophers would have to do the work themselves, as they have often done in the past, and as many of them do in the present time.

It seems more difficult to claim for philosophy the kind of impersonal statements with which science is familiar. Every philosophical system is conditioned to a large degree by personal elements. Though the truth sought is obviously unbiased, it is impossible to conceive a philosopher without prejudices. In fact, prejudice is a driving force in the elaboration of any philosophical system. It is the unavoidable condition of the self-expression of the individual by means of universal statements.

But is it not the case with scientific systems also when considered in their historical perspective? Many are apt to forget that science is not a ready made system which is universally exact; but the result of an evolutionary process. At each stage of this evolution, scientific theories, even mathematics, show the influence of their authors and of the intellectual climate of the time. They are later neutralized, so to speak, and incorporated in an impersonal account of science which leaves out the individual details and the marks of failure. But even then, they cannot be final: the history of science shows indeed that so far no scientific theory has come to stay. Actual and historical discoveries, new synthetic conceptions of the world, new moral and social ideas, even political and economic changes have influenced strictly scientific theories. There are also times when rival systems exist side by side until some crucial experiment decides between them for the time being.

The alteration undergone by scientific theories is cred-

ited to progress without giving even a thought to the fact that just as the discarded systems are considered no longer to be exact, so the present theories may be discarded later and should not be considered any more exact in themselves in the present. Indeed, if there is progress there is change; and if there is to be progress, there will be change in the future. The change, however, does not occur in the facts; but in our ideas about them, and in the appearance of the new facts obtained with the change. Strictly speaking then, sciences are no more exact than any other branch of knowledge. They may be exact within certain limits of time, within the range of certain types of facts, and within certain sets of postulates; but they cannot be absolutely exact.

It may be thought that whereas there are many philosophical answers to one question, there is only a single scientific answer to a question. But such is not always the case. There are often several explanations of any set of facts. A significant example is afforded by the history of mathematics. Theories are exact only with reference to certain definite sets of postulates. But no one can prove these postulates to be true or exact in themselves. Their hypothetical character affects the whole system which is based on them. Hence all mathematical theories are only conditionally true.

Philosophical systems may be structurally assimilated at least to a hypothetico-deductive science. Granted certain assumptions, certain consequences follow. Hence the variety of theories which enrich our knowledge. But none of them is less true than any scientific theory, be it mathematical or natural. Hence either the positive sciences are not exact, or philosophy is just as exact as they are. The only difference between them is this: whereas the sciences hasten to drop the burden of history with its attendant errors and mistakes in order to win an impersonal and neutral appear-

ance, philosophy is proud to carry with it all these burdens as a reminder of its personalist inspiration and its universalist aspiration.

Philosophy, therefore, is a science. To the same question there should not be two rival answers, a scientific and a philosophical one. For knowledge is one and indivisible. The history of thought, which forces philosophers and scientists alike to greater modesty is a permanent illustration of this conception.

Without going far back into history, we may refer to the wise men of ancient Greece who never thought of drawing a distinction between mathematics and natural science, psychology and moral science. So Thales and Pythagoras are hailed as the true founders of practically every major branch of knowledge. Indeed, the early Greek thinkers were at the same time not only philosophers and social reformers, mathematicians and physicists, but also politicians and soldiers, engineers and traders, — a fact which suggests a special conception of the unity of knowledge, if not of knowledge and action as well. Even the teaching of the Academy and the Lyceum, following the Pythagorean tradition, had a universal character, though some members of these schools, specialized in particular branches of learning. It was not until the Alexandrians that the various sciences were really differentiated and studied separately.

This unitary conception of knowledge was developed in a most remarkable and inspiring way. To take but one example, the Pythagoreans considered number not only as the basis of abstract science but also of music, ethics and religion. Such doctrines as that of the harmony of the spheres, or of the correspondence between certain numbers and the moral virtues, may appear fantastic or silly to many. Yet, they have a profound meaning; and strange as it may seem to be, mathematics is one of the fundamental

causes which influenced the social activities of the Pythagorean order. This is so much true, that the discovery of the irrational quantities was the spiritual cause of the breakdown of the brotherhood. But the spirit and the method remained: so, it was the necessity of "explaining" the irrationals which led Plato to build up a philosophical system in which mathematical and scientific ideas were freely used, for the justification of both Nature and the world of Ideas.

Indeed it seems natural that all knowledge should be one at a time when the particular sciences were in their infancy. There is however a deeper meaning in the unitary attitude of the Greek mind: it illustrates the fact that the growth of mathematical and scientific ideas is intimately interwoven with the stitches of philosophy proper. This attitude can thus be steadily traced through the ages up to the cosmological disquisitions of Copernicus, of Kepler, of Newton himself. Again, we find the mathematical and physical discoveries of Descartes influencing his "method," his philosophy, his cosmology and even his biology, and suggesting to Spinoza a geometrical proof of the dictates of conscience. With Leibniz we can see how the idea of the "infinitesimally small" is made the basis not only of the Calculus, but also of his conception of substance, of monads and their pre-established harmony, of psychology, ethics and theology. Further, though Kant's philosophy opens with this fundamental question "How pure mathematics is possible?" its collapse was largely due to the discovery of non-Euclidian geometry and to the invention of imaginary quantities which could not be easily explained with that system.

Kantian philosophy was, however, responsible for the definite estrangement of science and philosophy in the nineteenth century. Science was firmly attached to the realm of pure reason, while the major values of reality were left to

the charitable conclusions of practical reason, the arbitrariness of which ultimately casts doubts on the relevance of philosophical issues to the claims of positive knowledge. The alliance of the sciences with reason and the remarkable scientific developments of the time, led the Positivist school to discard philosophy from the sphere of human concerns. With philosophy at a discount, the way was clear for a mechanistic and a materialistic interpretation of the Universe and of Life. The notion that to be real a thing must be of the same nature as a piece of matter, became the predominant axiom upon which was based any explanation of scientific result. And as matter can be seen and touched, whatever was real ought to be seen and touched, at least theoretically. The analysis and description of a thing in terms of molecules and atoms and their movements was the sole condition of dealing with reality; all else, such as metaphysical values and religious experience, was a pointless incursion into a world of shadows. Yet, it is a curious fact that the further analysis of the objects perceived finally blew up the very "reality" they represented.

This is, however, the epic of the contemporary development of our knowledge. With matter considered as a hump in space-time and gradually vanishing into nothingness, the obvious and hard foundation of nineteenth-century science has disappeared. The imaginative conception of reality no longer being restricted by its likeness to the objects of perception, there could be no reason why the promptings of moral, esthetic and religious experience should be still considered as unreal, and the way was thus open for a reconsideration of the philosophical interpretation of the Universe on its merits. The immediate effect of this new situation was to narrow the gulf between science and philosophy. Physicists began to look for a solution of their particular problems in the boundless horizons they discovered beyond the traditional skyline of physics. In trying to

reach these hands across the bay, philosophers became more and more interested in the methods and results of the special sciences, and brought down metaphysics into the laboratory and the market place.

This mutual dependence, if not the assimilation, of science and philosophy is thus one of the major characteristics of the intellectual climate of our time. Neither of them is a detachable unit in an unorganized aggregate, or an independent agent which is not itself acted upon: they are both living members in the organic whole of knowledge. Science and philosophy have emerged from man's contact with Nature, and have become social habits; but they are customs so geared with the world about us that they must run smoothly, irrespective of climate, race or creed. As man is a social as well as a rational animal, the vast complex of social, emotional and intellectual behavior he has inherited from society, cannot be simply dismissed in the name of science if it cannot be described in abstract formulas. On the other hand, as science is a social outgrowth serving social ends, all attempts to isolate any aspect of it from the intellectual and social movement of which it is an integral part, can lead to nothing but false and dangerous conclusions.

This brings us back to the attitude of the wise men of ancient Greece, who naturally thought of human knowledge as essentially one, as against the atomized outlook of most thinkers of today. Whatever be the specialized fields of the scientists, they must now turn to philosophy for the connecting links between their diverse interests, so as to be able to discuss with competence the true significance and value of their results. In doing so, they are still within the realm of science; for the love of wisdom can no more forswear knowledge, than science can grow without the love of wisdom.

PROFESSOR MACINTOSH AND EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY

By RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

IN a recent article in *The Review of Religion* (May 1939), Douglas Clyde Macintosh stated that he had no disciples. In all the essays in his honor (*The Nature of Religious Experience*, Harpers, 1937), not one of his former students could be classified as a "Macintoshian." While they had learned well Professor Macintosh's lesson of clarity of thought and expression, they reflected very little of "theology as an empirical science." Such notable former students as J. Seelye Bixler and Vergilius Ferm explicitly rejected his empirical approach. I am not sure that Macintosh wants disciples, but surely there are former students in sympathy with his general approach to theology, and it is to be regretted that none such was included in the list of authors contributing essays in his honor.

Perhaps it will be of value in this article to indicate how one who is in agreement with Macintosh's fundamental purposes would deal with some of his significant contributions to theology. I doubt that his views have received a "cool reception," and I am certain that his theological convictions are an important part of the main stream of original American theology. I do not claim to be a disciple of Macintosh, but it is true that I use his *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (Scribners, 1925) as a text-book for my course in Christian Evidences, and I use his *Theology as an Empirical Science* (Macmillan, 1919), his article in *Religious Realism* (Macmillan, 1931), and his *Social Religion* (Scribners, 1939) in my advanced seminars. Some of my students refer to him as "St. Douglas."

In order to evaluate Macintosh's thought more adequately, it will be convenient to ask three questions: (1)

What Is the Knowledge Value of Religious Experience?

(2) How "Scientific" Can Empiricism Be in Religion?

(3) What Is the Place of "Moral Optimism" in Theology?

1. *What Is the Knowledge Value of Religious Experience?*

(A) The data for religious knowledge, according to Macintosh, are provided by "the right religious adjustment," which he defines as follows:

first, as presupposed, aspiration after a truly Christian life; then, concentration upon a Divine Being regarded as absolutely good and reliable; abandon of oneself and one's will to the holy will of that Divine Being; expectant waiting, and finally an act of faith deliberately accepting reconciliation with God and appropriating the moral reinforcement felt to be needed, together with the beginning of overt active response to the manifest will of God.¹

Almost all religious experiences could be described psychologically in these terms. There might be a sense of frustration in many experiences which is not reflected in this description, but if, as Macintosh claims, the relationship established is a dependable one, it would follow along these lines because frustration would be eliminated.

However, from the standpoint of values, it might be questionable whether "a truly Christian life" is sufficiently universal in its application. While one might admit that religious experience provides much of the data for establishing the existence and nature of God, it is doubtful whether such experiences must necessarily be Christian. The attitude of aspiration is certainly present, and it is usually in the direction of higher values, but it might not be conceived in Christian terms at all. If empiricism is to prove valid, it must deal with all religious phenomena, in all the religions of the world. Macintosh takes account of this universal

¹ "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy," in *Contemporary American Theology*, edited by Vergilius Ferm (Round Table, 1932) I, 282.

application in the right religious adjustment by saying it is aspiration toward an ideal of higher moral and spiritual attainment, not only as an ultimate end in itself but also as instrumental to the redemption and regeneration of society.²

This more general description is much more satisfactory.

A second question which arises is whether the term "will of God" necessarily has meaning without arbitrarily assuming specifically Christian virtues. If "will of God" means the highest values one now conceives, it becomes a good description of what happens in religious experience at its best. These values are objective, and relate to the actualities and potentialities of the situation. But if "will of God" means the will of an Other acting directly on the subject in the experience, in some unexplained external relationship, it carries us into a realm of experiences so subjective as to cast doubt on the knowledge value of the whole procedure.

What, then, really happens in this experience? It begins with a sense of yearning or aspiration; there is an immediate experience of contact or communion with something not ourselves; and there is a specific commitment to that reality in an act which is both moral and spiritual. This may lead to a definite change of direction in one's purposes, or it may result in a deeper devotion in the same direction as heretofore. This indicates at least a dual aspect of the experience.

Macintosh has made this clear in his distinction between "fundamental" and "experimental" religion. Fundamental religion is devotion "to an ideal regarded as worthy of man's absolute devotion," while experimental religion is dependence "upon a being regarded as worthy of man's

² "Experimental Realism in Religion," in *Religious Realism*, edited by D. C. Macintosh, p. 323.

absolute dependence.”³ This dual emphasis is present in all religious experience, and religion is good to the degree in which both of these are developed to the highest efficiency and purpose. Religions differ in the intensity of devotion and in the values to which they are devoted. If we can have experiences such as these, and can observe such experiences in others, certainly there must be some knowledge value there.

(B) This is likely to lead to a confusion in thinking and method, however, for values and so-called facts can get in each other's way. H. Richard Niebuhr's criticism of Macintosh's method in *The Nature of Religious Experience* seemed to me at that time to be particularly relevant, and I still think so. Macintosh, suggests Niebuhr, is guilty of using logically prior relative values for absolute evaluations of religious experience. He uses values gained from non-religious experience “as absolute criteria of theology.” In my review of that article,⁴ I pointed out that Niebuhr and Wieman do the same thing, and therefore Macintosh is no more guilty than the other two. The significance of Niebuhr's contribution at this point is not that we must avoid this pitfall, but that we can never escape the use of norms and values derived from prior non-religious experience. This is not a serious objection to an empirical approach through values, provided there are four safe-guards: (1) There should be recognition of the fact that religious experience is continuous with the rest of experience, and therefore that religious values are not different in kind from other values. (2) A valid religious experience leads to a revaluing of values, and the discovery of new values. (3) All values are relative. (4) Value-judgments are secondary to the primary relationship between organism and environ-

³ *Theology as an Empirical Science*, p. 235.

⁴ *Review of Religion* (May 1938), esp. pp. 475-476.

ment in estimating the truth of the data of religious experience.

Macintosh stresses the centrality of religious experience and religious values, but he would not deny that they are part of the general structure of experience and value. One of the most important parts of religious experience for Macintosh is the change of will, *i. e.*, of devotion to value, which takes place in the experience and which provides data for religious knowledge. All values are relative, and only the incompletely known religious object is assumed to be absolute in its goodness, and then only potentially. Macintosh is very clear in his distinction between dependence on God and devotion to God, although it seems to me that he puts the experience of value above the impact of reality.

Thus, while Macintosh makes use of logically prior value-judgments (as do Niebuhr and Wieman), he has adequate protection in so doing. In any approach through a functional theory of value, no matter how objective values may be, it is necessary to make use of some relative values in approaching the divine. Would there be any ground for recognizing the divine when it is experienced, unless there be previously experienced values by which to make the judgment?

(C) In any experience, says Macintosh, it is possible to have, to some extent, direct perception of the object. There is a "partial identity" between the subject and the object. There is some degree of immediacy between the experience of the object and the object itself. But the real object is always greater than the experience of the object, and the experience of the object may include elements which do not derive legitimately from the object.

It is thus that Macintosh develops a monistic realism which is critical. It is only by critical methods, such as the methods of science, that we can determine what aspects of

our experience are to be classified as identical with the object and which are either on the borderline or are downright false. It is thus that we can distinguish dreams and hallucinations from direct perceptions. This is sufficiently close to "common sense" to be acceptable to all but the most sophisticated philosophers. There may be disagreement about details, but the general epistemological theory is sufficiently adequate.

But his general empiricism holds even if one denies his specific epistemology. His theology does not depend on his critical monism. Provided we admit the validity of any realistic epistemology which gives immediate experience of reality, we can have knowledge. If we believe that we gain knowledge from any realm of direct experience, we can have it in religious experience.

With the acceptance of a realistic epistemology, it is consistent to follow Macintosh's theory of truth. There are three steps in the testing of any hypothesis: (1) It must be logically consistent with our accepted body of knowledge, and with itself. (2) It must be pragmatically adequate. (3) It must be tested in immediate experience. "Only what can be immediately experienced, perceived, empirically intuited in a crucial experiment, can be completely verified."⁵ Any concept which meets these requirements is as true as any inductive concept can ever be. It is as true as any hypothesis of empirical science which has been adequately tested.

In brief, this is all that Macintosh claims for his empirical method. By a careful analysis of the data provided by the right religious adjustment, in which one has direct experience of something beyond oneself, it is possible to establish concepts which meet the tests of truth. To this extent, we have a verified concept of God. Unless one is to retreat into

⁵ *Religious Realism*, p. 334.

the protective coverings of rationalism (as does Ferm) or mythology (as does Reinhold Niebuhr) or extreme supernaturalism (which former students of Macintosh are *not* inclined to do), it is difficult to deny the validity of this method in religious epistemology.

(D) When we turn to the application of this method, we find that Macintosh makes use of two ideas which he believes are essential: critical monism, and perception in a complex. We have already admitted that the substitution of any realistic epistemology will not spoil the general outlines of the method, although Macintosh would claim that Calhoun's dualism, e. g., would lead to agnosticism.⁶ I, personally, would be willing to accept the major tenets of critical monism.

I am not sure that I understand exactly what perception in a complex, or perceptual intuition, really means. If it means that the impact on the organism in religious experience is extremely complex, and that there is some sort of open awareness⁷ which leaves an indelible impression on the subject, and that there is a change of some type in the general make-up of the personality, I would be willing to grant that this is an adequate empirical account of what happens. This type of experience provides definite data for religious knowledge.

However, if "perceptual intuition" means that we have access to certain peculiar channels of knowledge in religious experience, I would reject it as insufficiently demonstrated. There is a definite interaction between the subject and its environment in religious experience, but it is no more mysterious than is aesthetic experience.

Because of this concept of "perceptual intuition," there is room in Macintosh's position for the appeal to history.

⁶ *Review of Religion* (May 1939), pp. 387-388.

⁷ As Wieman suggests in *Religious Experience and Scientific Method*, Chapter VII.

His empiricism is not limited to the immediate situation. There is room for memory, thinking, and communication of experience as part of the general intuitive process. So while the immediate experiences are definitive, there is no denial of the knowledge value of experiences recorded in history. The making of a place for history gives a wider perspective to empiricism, provided it is not taken as authoritative, and it is a protection against theological positivism.

(E) Macintosh claims that as a result of the examination and testing of the data of religious experience, certain concepts concerning the existence and nature of God can be adequately verified. *It must be noticed how little he claims as empirically verified, and how he combines the experience of value with a sense of reality.* It is because readers and students have confused his empirically verified knowledge of God with the rest of his theology that they have been inclined to reject his results.

The religious object is "the factor which responds dependably to persistence in the right specifically religious adjustment (as defined), by promoting goodness of will and effectiveness in its activity."⁸ God is that which responds, by increasing our effectiveness, and by promoting devotion to value. Thus, God, as a fact about which we make an appreciative judgment, is empirically known as "an immanent value-producing factor."

We have essentially scientific knowledge of a process immanent in the universe and in man which is divine in value, a divine behavior of which we have to some extent discovered the conditions.⁹

This is all that Macintosh claims as verified knowledge about God. This is the truth value of religious experience.

All we can verify concerning the nature of God is what he does, and then only to a limited extent. It is difficult to

⁸ *Religious Realism*, p. 400 (Italics mine).

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

see how anyone can object to this empirical approach, for it is consistent with common sense, empirical method, and inductive logic. Thus it attempts to reflect reality as it exists independently of our experience of it. It does not pretend to give us a complete theology, for Macintosh has never claimed that the whole of his theology was empirically verifiable. He has claimed that this much of his theology is both empirical and scientific.

2. *How "Scientific" Can Empiricism Be in Religion?*

Even if we grant that this elementary concept of God is empirically verified, this does not necessarily mean that it is "essentially scientific knowledge." Scientific method implies that a concept or the reality which it represents can be tested in a controlled experiment, and that anyone who wishes may get exactly the same result by fulfilling the same conditions. The "exact" sciences are therefore quantitative sciences. When the word "science" is used in broader sense, it still implies the possibility of careful observation under fairly constant conditions. The studies of psychology and sociology are hardly exact sciences, but they are usually much more accurate than any theology can be.

Of course Macintosh has never claimed such exactitude for his theology. All he has ever claimed is that there is "the promise of a dependable tendency in the direction of absolutely desirable results, primarily in the will and ultimately in the life and experience more generally."¹⁰ In this sense, most religious realists guard themselves by use of the term "scientific spirit" rather than "scientific method." This protects them from the misunderstanding Macintosh has received.

There is empirical verification of a very limited concept of God which proceeds from an analysis of religious experience, and in a very broad sense we might call this "scien-

¹⁰ *Review of Religion* (May 1939), p. 398.

tific." But most of theology is speculative, even when it is based upon empirical foundations. A great deal of Macintosh's theology is frankly speculative, but always consistent with his fundamental premises. His superstructure can in no sense be called "scientific," and when Macintosh claims that theology can be an empirical science, he leaves himself open to misrepresentation at this point.

It might be well to note that Macintosh is really much more empirical than Henry Nelson Wieman at the level of verified knowledge. There are no claims about the personality, intelligence, or creatorship of God in Macintosh's empirically verified theology, while Wieman goes so far as to deny these attributes to his religious object. At the same time, Wieman denies that there can be any valid theology outside the results of observation and rational inference. Macintosh has room for a speculative theology which can be built on his empirical foundations, where he can discuss the attributes of God. For all practical purposes, as well as for philosophical perspective, Macintosh's approach is much more sound. Wieman is really reduced to a religious positivism of immediacy by his method, although his naturalistic metaphysics enriches his position greatly.

It is to be regretted that Wieman has been so "confidently damnatory" concerning Macintosh's emphasis on the centrality of religious experience, for the most brilliant aspect of Wieman's own thought has been in this field as he developed it in *Religious Experience and Scientific Method*. The positions of the two men have been close together, and both of them have done much to clarify the whole empirical approach to theology. But Wieman has turned from this emphasis to that of a naturalistic rationalism in his *Growth of Religion*,¹¹ although the richness of his empirical insights can never be hidden.

¹¹ (Willett, Clark & Co., 1938), pp. 423-427.

It must be remembered, furthermore, that while Macintosh has insisted on the centrality of religious adjustment as providing the basic data for religious knowledge, he has always insisted that this knowledge must be consistent with the rest of our generally accepted body of facts. Also, general experience may well be religiously interpreted to add to religious knowledge. Experience may be religiously significant without being religious experience.

The central thesis of the Macintoshian theology is not objectionable if we grant his presuppositions; and his presuppositions are simply those of common sense. If we can have direct experience of anything, we can have it of the religious object in the right religious adjustment, and if we can determine to some extent the dependable factor in that adjustment and its response, then we can have a concept of God which *to that extent* is empirically verified, and is, in a broad sense, a "scientific" truth. This serves as the basis for any empirical theology.

3. *What Is the Place of "Moral Optimism" in Theology?*

(A) Another point of confusion among those who study Macintosh is his doctrine of "moral optimism." This is presented in elementary form in *Theology as an Empirical Science*.¹² It was developed into a definite doctrine in his later volumes. In his *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, a chapter is devoted to it. Moral optimism

expresses and is expressed in the conviction that if only a person's will is right, he need have no fear of anything the universe can do to him; no absolute or final disaster can come to him whose will is steadfastly devoted to the true ideal.¹³

In *Religious Realism*, he defines it: "We have a right to believe as we must in order to live as we ought, if we can—logically and psychologically."¹⁴

¹² P. 260.

¹³ P. 46.

¹⁴ P. 405.

There is nothing objectionable in these statements, provided the existence of God has already been established. But in *The Reasonableness of Christianity* the doctrine of moral optimism appears in Chapter three, and the argument for the existence of God appears in Chapter six. Moral optimism is assumed as a basis for belief in God.

It is at this point that my students always object, and it is only by turning to *Theology as an Empirical Science* or the article in *Religious Realism* that I can show them that the empirical argument for God does not rely on moral optimism. Many objections have been made to Macintosh's position because of this variation in his position.

There is a place where moral optimism is legitimate in theological theory, but it comes after we have established the minimum concept of God which is empirically verifiable. It is part of the method for establishing a philosophical superstructure for empirical theology.

Macintosh has always claimed that empirical knowledge of God is limited, and that we would be wrong to stop at that point. We must never assume that the God of verified knowledge is the Christian God or the full nature of God. All we know is that

on condition of the right religious adjustment, a Factor or Reality, which we may call God, conditions in the individual, primarily in the will but ultimately in the nature more generally, the characteristic religious experience of moral and religious salvation.¹⁵

This basic concept of God is inadequate for practical purposes, for philosophical speculation, and for religious worship. Even Wieman would admit this.¹⁶ So Macintosh has developed three levels of religious knowledge. (1) There is *verified knowledge*, based on experience, adequately and

¹⁵ *Is There a God?* (Willett, Clark), p. 256.

¹⁶ Cf., *Growth of Religion*, p. 363.

critically tested by logic, pragmatism, and experiment. (2) There are *reasonable beliefs*, which consist of concepts which cannot be verified directly, but which can be shown to be almost certain. Moral optimism, value-judgments, and analogical inferences are helpful at this point. (3) There are *permissible surmises*, or workable opinions, which help to complete the picture. These result from critical use of the will-to-believe, over-beliefs, and ultimate guesses about the nature of the universe.

By the application of such methods, empirical theology is extended so that we may have a concept of God which is adequate for religious living and philosophical perspective. It seems to me that some such extension of empiricism is necessary if we are to get beyond theological positivism. Such a method as Macintosh suggests can be used, with variations, in any philosophical framework. It offers more possibility of permanence than does Wieman's empiricism, because Wieman's work is understandable only in connection with his naturalistic metaphysics. His position would break down in any other metaphysical system, unless it were supported by such auxiliary methods of knowledge as Macintosh suggests. But, of course, Wieman repudiates any such development.

(B) One may disagree with the particular details of Macintosh's application of method without denying the fundamental principle. Gerald Birney Smith felt that Macintosh tested

the standard doctrines which were worked out in the Christianity of past centuries, and were formulated with the aid of a type of metaphysics which modern empirical science repudiates.¹⁷

Wieman says it is a form of wishful-thinking and the defining of specific cherished beliefs.¹⁸ Now if Macintosh were

¹⁷ *American Journal of Theology*, 24:153-154.

¹⁸ *Journal of Religion*, 12:421.

merely trying to reinstate a group of outmoded beliefs, I am convinced that his theological superstructure would be much more elaborate than it is. In spite of Smith and Wieman, it is no crime to test the essential beliefs of Christianity by empirical method and its legitimate extensions. It is, perhaps, Macintosh's success in finding room for essential Christianity in his system which has cooled off his more radical colleagues.

After establishing God as an immanent, value-producing Factor (How different is this from "the growth of meaning and value in the world?"), Macintosh goes on to say that it is reasonable to believe in the conservation of values. If this Factor, or God, actually conserves values, it is to that extent a transcendent power, independent of man in its working. This reality may be believed to behave as if it is intelligent and good, in the light of our experiences and observations.¹⁹ Therefore, we may surmise that God is intelligent and good. We may also surmise that he is at least personal, because of the possibility of personal relations in the right religious adjustment.

Macintosh says:

God's personality as both symbol and truth, real and ideal, demanded as object of dependence and worship, and morality's presupposition that the absolute ideal is not yet fully realized but is to be made real with human help, find reconciliation in the concept of a real divine will, which is ideally good, but not yet fully real in the world of human experience. But it seems reasonably believable that God may be super-personal in some sense unintelligible to us, while including some elements of personality.²⁰

This is not the whole of Macintosh's theology, but it expresses my view of its central, vital, and important theme. Macintosh's theology is rich with many rewarding

¹⁹ Cf., *Religious Realism*, pp. 405-406.

²⁰ Quoted from class notes.

byways which cannot be summarized. It has minor details with which some will not agree. But the central argument is clear and easy to grasp.

4. *Conclusion.*

It seems to me that the most important contribution that America has made to theology has come from Yale's Professor Macintosh. The appeal to experience, and to religious experience in particular, gives us the basis for a new theology. Wieman and Smith are wrong, I believe, in insisting that the new theology must be different from the main stream of essential Christian beliefs. After all, if empiricism is right at all, it was used in some way or other in determining basic Christian beliefs, and they cannot all be wrong, however erroneous particular statements may be. Macintosh is perfectly right in testing again these inherited beliefs, as long as he continues to remain free from prejudice in the examining of them.

Empirical method in theology is valid, but limited. It must be stated again and again that empirical method establishes only the basic belief in an immanent God. Extensions of empirical method are also necessary, but they do not have the same status as verified knowledge. They are more subject to the shifting sands of scientific and metaphysical theorizing, and it may be that the presently popular philosophy of organism, as exemplified in the thought of Whitehead, Lloyd Morgan, and others, may be the best solution for today. Macintosh, as well as Wieman, finds much of value in such speculation. Naturalism as developed by James Bissett Pratt provides a suggestive method and framework for further experimenting along the same lines.²¹

It is important that we realize the significance of Macintosh's contribution to American theology. In his empiri-

²¹ Cf., *Naturalism* (Yale Univ. Press).

cism, we have the one distinctive note in the development of American thought which differentiates it from European speculation. Just because his disciples have not been numerous, it is no indication that his contribution has not been great. I am convinced that if this country remains free from the authoritarian fever, there will be further developments along the lines of empirical theology, and that theology will develop from its empirical base along the lines of Macintosh's reasonable beliefs and the richly analogical thought of Robert Calhoun.²²

I think also that empiricism itself will develop along the two lines suggested by Macintosh. There will be the analyses of religious experience as such, to determine the objective reality of a power beyond ourselves, relatively free from value presuppositions.²³ There will also be a careful analysis of the experience of value, both within and outside of specific religious experience.²⁴ In the combination of these dual approaches, the empirically verified concept of God will be aligned with our great religious heritage in such a way as to provide a deeper, richer, and more abundant manner of living.²⁵

Whether or not such empirical theology will be called "scientific" is a matter of vocabulary. I feel, personally, that it is an unimportant controversy. I would rather leave the word "science" to the more exact sciences, and claim only that the concept of God is adequately verified by empirical method. God is sufficiently dependable in religious living for all practical purposes, but we still know too little of God as experienced to claim scientific accuracy.

²² Cf., *God and the Common Life* (Scribners), pp. 179 ff.

²³ As in Bernard Meland's *Modern Man's Worship* (Harpers).

²⁴ As in Harold Bosley's *Quest for Religious Certainty* (Willett, Clark & Co.)

²⁵ As in various articles by John Bennett.

PERSONALISM AND CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

By JARED S. MOORE

DEAN KNUDSON'S article on "Personalism and Theology" in the 1939 "Summer Number" of *The Personalist** was written, naturally enough, from the Protestant point of view; and it may not be amiss to supplement this interesting analysis and comparison by another along similar lines but from the distinctly Catholic standpoint. Although the Church of Rome has adopted St. Thomas as its official philosopher, Catholic theology received its first official formulation under Platonic rather than Peripatetic influences, as Dr. Knudson indicates, and can as easily be interpreted in terms of modern personalism as in those of medieval scholasticism.

Dr Knudson discusses the influence of the personalistic philosophy upon Christian ideas under six successive heads: (1) the epistemological basis of religious belief, (2) its metaphysical basis, (3) the doctrine of the Trinity, (4) the doctrine of man, (5) Christology, and (6) the doctrine of the Church. It would be unprofitable to examine with too critical an eye the thoughts presented under the first two of these six heads, but on the other four the Catholic is impelled to offer some corrective suggestions.

On the Trinity, Dean Knudson finds the traditional notion of tripersonality in a substantial unity "out of harmony with modern personalistic individualism," and prefers to substitute for it a "modified Sabellianism"—the idea of a single Person, truly expressing "His essential nature" in three types of activity. In this interpretation, "what we emphasize today is not personality *in* God but the personality *of* God," and "think of the three 'Persons' of the Trin-

* All quotations herein are from that article, unless otherwise indicated.

ity as essential modes of the Divine Being rather than as distinct individual beings within Him."

The Catholic view is almost the reverse of this, and yet is, I am confident, as personalistic as the one suggested. Let us first examine some of the concepts employed by Dr. Knudson in his paragraphs on the Trinity. *Personality* is, of course, for the personalist the highest category in terms of which reality must ultimately be interpreted: God, then, the Original Being on whom all others depend, must be a personal Being—i. e., a Being in whom the personal quality essentially subsists. But what is a "personal being"? Fundamentally, I should reply, a Subject-Object, a being capable of making himself the object of his own contemplation and of his own activity. In other words, whereas everything of which we may think is by that very fact an object, a person is in addition and distinctively a subject as well. Now *Substantiality* is a purely *objective* category—the highest category in terms of which objects may be interpreted; but for that very reason inadequate as an ultimate category of *Reality*, as Reality is *Subject* as well as object. *Individuality* is a third category involved in the doctrine of the Trinity, and should not be identified with either of the others without explanation and defense.

If my account of these categories is correct, the personalistic interpretation of the Catholic dogma of the Trinity becomes clear. When the Catholic says that God is "Three Persons in One Substance," he means first and most importantly that God is one objective reality; but also that in that Godhead are three Subjects or Egos. When our Lord addresses His Father, it is in such language as, "*I thank Thee, O Father*" (Matt. 12:25); again, at His Baptism, His Father says to Him, according to one report of that event, "*Thou art My beloved Son*" (Mark 1:11); and similarly of the Holy Spirit our Lord is recorded as saying,

“when the Comforter is come . . . , *He* shall testify of *Me* (John 16:26). It *is*, then, “personality *in* God” that interests the Catholic personalist. And Dr. Knudson is mistaken when he interprets the Catholic doctrine as implying that these three Persons are “distinct individual beings within” the Godhead, thus identifying individuality and personality. No, God, like every human being, is one Individual Being, one objective reality; but whereas every normal man is one person as well as one individual, God is three Persons but one Individual. This is the Catholic doctrine, and it is, I submit, a distinctly personalistic one.

As to the doctrine of man I shall not say more than to point out two things: first, that what Dean Knudson calls “freedomism” or “synergism” is as truly Catholic as it is “popular evangelical” teaching today, as opposed to the Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity. But my second point is that this does not involve a denial of the idea of original sin, if this idea is properly understood. “Sin,” says Dr. Knudson, “is universal not because of . . . any mysterious inheritance from the past, but because of the obstacles that lie in the way of completely avoiding it”—obstacles in the environment, I presume is meant, as opposed to inherited ones. This sentence I should be obliged to condemn as an example of the fallacy of false antithesis—“not this, but that”—and to move two amendments: first, substitute “not *only* because” and “but *also* because” for the simple “not . . . but”; and secondly, delete the twice printed word, “mysterious.” Everything in this world is more or less mysterious, and there is nothing distinctively so about the laws of heredity. That man does inherit tendencies to choose the evil rather than the good seems to me to be one of the most obvious of all truths, however one may explain it; and the doctrine of original sin may most naturally be interpreted in these days, I should say, as meaning that man

began his specific existence as (in Dr. Knudson's language) a "non-moral" being, that as he developed the power to discriminate between right and wrong he on some occasion or other chose evil, and that that choice and other similar ones so corrupted his nature that it has continued to mar the behavior of the human species ever since. But this is a "personal" taint, a taint of every human *ego*; and yet, by use of the proper methods, among which the Catholic would stress the sacraments (as indicated below), we are able to revive our lost freedom and again, by God's grace and our own efforts coöperating "synergistically," to choose the right in the face of temptations to do the opposite.

On the subject of Christology, I should be obliged emphatically to take issue with most of what Dr. Knudson says as to the Nature and Person of our Lord. The Catholic personalist would deny that the traditional "two-nature" doctrine is "pre-personalistic" and "outmoded" today, even though it did originate in "pre-personalistic" times; and would deny also that "the 'ego' of [Christ's] being was human"—rather, he would say, it *is* (not was) *divine*. As the Catholic would view it, the situation with regard to the Nature and Person of Christ is in a way the reverse of that with regard to the Triune Godhead: God, we saw, is Three Persons in One Substance or Nature; Christ, we now say, is Two Natures or Substances in One Person. As these categories were interpreted above, what this means is that Christ, as Second Person of the Holy Trinity, is eternally one Ego or Subject; but that at the Incarnation He added a second, human, "Nature" or objective character to His divinity. As *Subject*, then, Christ is one; but His *objective* nature is twofold. The central question of all in Christian theology, however, is this: Is the Egohood of our Lord divine or human? and the emphatic answer of Catholic tradition is, "divine." And, however dissatisfied the Protestant

personalist may be with the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, it is hard to see how he can deny that Catholic Christology is personalistic "up to the hilt." I would, therefore, suggest an amendment to one of Dr. Knudson's sentences on this matter, along lines similar to those suggested on the subject of original sin: "The 'divinity' of Christ does not consist [*merely*, though it does in part] in His having within His being a divine 'nature' or 'substance,' but [*also* and especially] in His possession of a unique God-consciousness," an eternal divine Egohood.

As to the Atonement, I am inclined to accept a great deal that Dean Knudson has to say, but I think it is because what he says is on the whole good Catholic doctrine. The "traditional theories," as he calls them, of "transferred merit and imputed guilt," which he properly condemns, are far more Protestant than Catholic, and "traditional" only in a secondary sense. As a matter of fact, there is no official *dogma* of the Atonement comparable to that of the Incarnation. But when it comes to Dr. Knudson's acceptance of the "moral theory," we must demur; and it is interesting to note that even Josiah Royce, as truly a personalist as one could wish, especially by the time he came to write *The Problem of Christianity*, but in no sense a practicing Christian, saw the utter futility of such a theory as that. If man *needs* no Atonement, if he can save himself without any help from above, then it may inspire him emotionally to contemplate the self-sacrifice of a noble soul two thousand years ago; but if man *does* need Atonement, nothing short of personal union with an ever-present Divine Saviour can satisfy that need—not the "imputation" to one man of the goodness of another, but the participation of man in the very life of God Himself.

Finally, with regard to the Church, Dr. Knudson quite begs the question when he identifies the "personal" theory

thereof with what he calls the "symbolic" theory taught by Protestants. Surely, a view which sees the Church as a living organism with Christ as Head, and its priests as personal instruments for the dispensation of the grace which flows from that Head, is as compatible with personalism as that which sees in it a purely human institution with only an "educational and inspirational function"; and surely also, for the Catholic at least as much as for the Protestant is the Church "in its essential nature . . . a spiritual or personal institution."

More specifically, the Catholic doctrine of the sacraments is distinctly personalistic, though this point is strangely misunderstood by Protestants. For the Catholic teaching is that through, and only through, the operation of the Holy Spirit, the Third *Person* of the Holy Trinity, the sacraments convey the grace of God to those souls, and only to those, who are spiritually prepared to receive and benefit by that grace. They are not, therefore, merely mechanical, impersonal acts and forms of words—just symbols, on the one hand, or magical incantations on the other—but media of communication between Person and person, channels through which Spirit acts upon spirit.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF CHINESE PAINTING

W

By YU-SHAN HAN

ILLIAM JAMES says:

So many philosophies are just so many visions, modes of feeling the whole push of life, and seeing the whole drift of life, forced on one by one's character and experience, and as a whole preferred....¹

"The whole push of life and the whole drift of life" are the complexity and the universal of reality, while the "feeling" and the "seeing" are the reactions of the individual. It is determinism and indeterminism, because it is forced and at the same time preferred. To put it more concretely:

philosophy is the impartial search for truth, and as such it is necessarily universal, but it is also the search for truth by human beings, and accordingly, it is inevitably local or individual.²

Likewise, painting has its basic universal elements, but it is executed by human beings and so shows individuality. The individuality or the uniqueness, based upon the universal creates the various types and schools of art. In other words, the tradition and discipline of any people make a difference, for the artist is an expression of that tradition and discipline. Therefore, we are concerned with the universal aspects of painting individualized or localized by the Chinese tradition and discipline.

Our next logical question would be then, to find out what the conditional influences were upon the Chinese people. The common environment of all peoples of the world is nature, but the ways of meeting that environment by the various peoples have brought about individual expressions in art, philosophy, and religion.

Any treatment of Chinese culture must begin with

¹ *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 20-21.

² Preface in the Chinese edition of *Introduction to Philosophy*, E. S. Brightman.

China's way of looking at nature, because from the very beginning nature furnished the basis for her religious, political, intellectual, and esthetic principles. A general review of how nature has always been so essential in China will help us better to understand the philosophical ideas in the roots of Chinese painting. Among the old Chinese writings are the following significant records: The Chinese flourished, not on the plains and along river valleys, but in mountains. A chieftain was called Lin-Cheng or "king of the forest." Another title of the ruler was Yueh, meaning "mountain." The ancient people were also referred to by Mencius (the contemporary of Plato) as Chiu-min, "the mountaineers." Later when a feudal state was established, the nobles had to journey to some mountain to pay homage to the emperor, who travelled about according to regulated itinerary, but was always stationed for audience in a mountain. At the inauguration of an emperor, also, the grand ceremonies took place in some mountain. For this reason we have the worship of the Five Sacred Mountains.

Nature worship may be said to be the first and the last religion of China. In the primitive form, it was an appreciation of the bounty of nature; hence, a belief in the spirits of mountains and rivers and in the deity of the heavenly bodies. Symbols engraved or moulded on ancient bronze vessels of various kinds show this gratitude. Ancestor worship may be interpreted as a development of nature worship, for the people looked upon nature as a manifestation of the creator and the sustaining power of life; parents then were regarded as a "particular" expression of this nature; therefore, the first duty of man was to worship nature, and the second was to worship his ancestors. Many tablets can be found inscribed with the five characters: Tien Ti Chun Chin Shih, or Heaven, Earth, the Ruler, Parents, Teacher.

These religious ideas were furthered by imperial patronage and made permanent through philosophical interpretation. Politically speaking, the belief in a benevolent and purposive nature, which provided the people with "things and laws of things" gave birth to the Chinese version of the divine right of kings, and also to the idea of the right to revolt against a bad ruler because "heaven hears through the people; heaven sees through the people." The Great Canons for political administration attributed to Emperor Yu (2205-2197 B.C.) made the five elements the basis for the first essentials in government, because metal, wood, water, fire, and earth represented all human necessities as well as human activities. Nature served as a basis for political principles and furnished the ground-work for government structure. For more than thirty centuries, the Six Ministries were a permanent feature of Chinese government. These six ministries were: Ministries of Heaven, Earth, Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter. Heaven is great because it covers all; hence, the ministry in charge of all important affairs of the State was designated Heaven; earth supplies and educates; hence, the ministry of agriculture and education was called Earth; spring is the return to new life and an occasion for festivities; therefore, the ministry in charge of ceremonies was called Spring. Summer is a trying period; hence the one in charge of military duties and of peace and order was called Summer. Autumn is the time for reaping; therefore, the ministry in charge of justice, reward, and punishment was called Autumn; and winter is leisure for the farmers, so the ministry in charge of public works could make use of them then, and was called Winter.

Most important of all was the fact that nature furnished the foundations of Chinese writing as a means of thought-expression and of thought-content. Not only did the sages

of olden times learn from the objects of nature to make signs, but also saw the significance of the ways of nature. Once Confucius, standing by a stream, remarked, "The course of nature passes just like this (stream), not ceasing day or night!" Another familiar passage from the sage was,

The wise find pleasure in water; the virtuous find pleasure in mountains. The wise are active; the virtuous are tranquil. The wise are joyful; the virtuous are long-lived.³

Confucius himself had meditated on nature and had found expression for his moral philosophy from the tranquility and the movement of nature.

Nature is the common environment of peoples and also the common source of art. Art, in the true sense of the word, is nature made human. Painting is at once an expression of what nature presents, and of what the artist re-presents. This is a universal fact concerning painting. Now the Chinese painters take a definitely idealistic view of nature. Every object or event of nature must be understood in the nature of mind which is purposive, meaningful, creative, and ever-progressing. The Chinese people are generally considered humanistic and not mystical, but I would say our mysticism has been developed along humanistic lines rather than upon religious lines. Indeed, we are more mystical in experience before mountains and rivers than we are in the presence of idols in temples.

Any artist to achieve the place of a master-painter in China, must go through three stages of preparation in relation to nature: first, he must acquire a discriminating mind by seeing and by reading abundantly; second, he must attain an intuitive mind through meditation until art is second nature to him; third, he must participate in the creative activity of the universal spirit. All are to be de-

³ *Confucian Analects*, Book VI, Chapter XXI, Legge's translation, p. 74.

rived, directly or indirectly, from nature. Aristotle's "art imitates nature" makes nature the creative force, the productive principle of the universe. The Chinese readily agree with this idea that "fine art is the free and independent activity of the mind," but when the Greeks go on to consider fine art in a domain "outside religion and politics, and having an end distinct from both that of education and moral improvement," the Chinese part company with them. The master-artist in China was first of all a scholar and a gentleman. There could be no other way. In other words, the whole — morality, learning, religion, politics, esthetics — were in one category.

Irving Babbitt showed keen observation when he said:

Though Aristotle and Confucius come together in their doctrine of the mean, one should hasten to add that in their total attitude toward life they reveal the characteristic difference between European and the Asiatic temper.⁴

Aristotle, following the thesis of Socrates that knowledge is virtue, became a master of those that know, while Confucius, following the traditional theme of ethics, was master of those that will. The occidental tradition is that knowledge is virtue in that it is power to conquer; Confucian tradition holds that will means will to live up to the best with the intellect as instrument. The Chinese quest does not permit a separation of spiritual values from material ones, for everything converges in human happiness and personal nobility.

So much for the general aspect. Let us turn now to some specific philosophical ideas. There are two ways of approach to the subject: one is to measure Chinese painting by the major divisions of philosophy; the other is to make a critical examination into the various principles of Chinese painting, and to trace their significant philosophical im-

⁴ *Democracy and Leadership*, p. 164.

plications. The latter is perhaps more profitable, though it may not be so systematic.

Just as the objects and ways of nature furnish the basis of Chinese moral, intellectual, and esthetic principles, so theories of nature afford the key to the interpretation of Chinese painting. First, dualism has been characteristic of Chinese thought. By dualism we mean the two seemingly contrary principles of life. The duality in the Chinese Yin and Yang has exerted great influence on Chinese life. These two principles can not be exactly compared with Aristotle's potentiality and actuality, nor with the western traditional dualism of matter and mind, but they are the supplementary principles whose interaction results in a mixed world of order and uncertainties. However, they are not like wheat and tares, for they proceed from the same root, namely, reality. It is through change we can appreciate permanence; and only in a living world can we include death. There are many interpretations of these two principles, but it is safe to say that through the unity of contraries, whether we call them the weak and the strong, the rigid and the tender, the male and the female, or heaven and earth, we find meaning, or life. No individual is of any significance without universality, and vice versa. For example, in science (theoretical) we find the universal that contains many particulars while in art we find the particular which suggests the universal. Chinese painting, because of the emphasis upon these dual aspects, early caught the fundamental principles of art. Dualism is a principle of freedom and of variation. Li Sze-Chen (circ. 689 A.D.), art critic of the early T'ang period, says:

In the history of the Liang dynasty, we hear about a Buddhist temple in Kiangsi. The official name for the temple was Wa Ku Sze, or Temple of the Concave and the Convex. It was so known because Chang Sung Yao (disciple of Mme. Wei

Shao, d. 140 A.D.)'s painting, which hung over the entrance, showed such a mastery of Yin and Yang, light and shade, that the painting stood as if it were a picture in relief or of carving. Capable of bringing unity of Yin and Yang, he mastered the mystery of creative expression in a thousand changes, and ten thousand transformations.⁶

This leads us to the second aspect in connection with painting; namely, mysticism. Mysticism, by definition, is the immediate consciousness of, and union with something not ourselves. The individual life becomes confluent with a wider life, like a drop of water in a stream. The Chinese view of the universe is dominated by the idea that every object has a spiritual quality. Not only men have selves, but mountains and rivers have selves, also. They, moreover, represent the great spiritual qualities worthy of human meditation. We call the individual self the small self, while nature is the big self. The mystical character of aesthetic experience is universal, but the Chinese thought never loses its humanistic bent; that is, in harmony with nature our own individuality finds greater expression, rather than losing identity in it.

The abundance of cosmic myths in China, the influence of poetry and calligraphy, and the charm of Buddhism, all engendered a belief in the divine inspiration of nature. Through this inspiration the art of painting could be made pure and original. Here again we see the universal principle. The ways of receiving the mystical experience from the larger self differentiate the Chinese artists and their work. This is all bound up with their mode of life, and their ideals for life expression. The avenues for receiving mystical inspiration are inclusive in the unity of poetry, writing, and painting. In the ten thousand volumes the scholar must assimilate, and in the ten thousand miles he must

⁶ Liu Hai Su, *Famous Paintings of China*, Vol. I, p. 9. (In Chinese, published by the Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1935.)

travel to become a master artist, he keeps constant company with the music and the grandeur of the universe.

Tsung Ping (375-443 A.D.), a contemporary of Ku Kai Chih, was a prominent painter of landscape and a great player of the Confucian harp. He once said:

The sages cherish Tao (the Word) in order to be harmonious with creation. The virtuous ones keep their minds pure in order to discern the beauty of the forms. These experiences are possible because of the spiritual being of mountains and rivers. The methods of the wise and the good may differ, but the result of mystical ecstasy is the same.⁶

Poems of the T'ang Dynasty (619-905) show this experience of immediate union with nature in almost every poem. Yen Yen-chih (384-456) once expressed his own experience:

To look at the autumn clouds makes the soul soar as a bird; to feel the wind of spring, makes the thoughts go far and wide. This joy is arrested, and made immortal by only "a turning of the hand to register the divine flash of the spirit.." Then he exclaimed, "Such is the joy of painting!"⁷

The third philosophical implication of Chinese painting is found in the creative conception of the art of painting. The mystical and the pantheistic aspects of thought did not destroy the humanistic aspect. Painting is the expression of the artist's mind where both the being and the becoming of nature are arrested through form and color, but the "touch" of the creative master transmits the spirit, not only of the object, but of the master himself. The solidity of a mountain has its vitality as well as its rhythm, while the fluency of rivers has its movement as well as its control. He who can do this creative work must have had the mystical experience. The artist fills his mind with cosmic energy

⁶ *A Preface to Mountains and Streams (Landscape) Painting* (In Chinese) cf. translation by Siren, *The Chinese on the Art of Painting*, p. 14.

⁷ Liu Hai Su, *A Discourse on the Six Canons of the Art of Chinese Painting* (In Chinese), p. 11. (Published by the China Book Company, Shanghai, 1932.)

as he meditates upon mountains and streams, and it is by this he makes his creation dynamic.

Fourth, a treatment of the philosophical background of Chinese painting forces us to answer the question: What is the end or the goal of fine art, especially of painting? A free exposition of Chang Yen Yuan's (9th century) statements will serve as a concise summary of the Chinese view as to the end or goal of the art of painting. He says:

As the art of painting penetrates and scrutinizes all the complexities and unities, and the open and secret meanings of the universe, it completes culture and strengthens right relationship of humanity.⁸

It completes culture, because it arrests nature and affords consummatory experience of enjoyments and appreciation. It strengthens human relationships, for enjoyments and appreciation bring unity of perfect repose and perfect energy. In other words, the art of painting adds fresh and deeper meanings to the common expressions of nature and the usual activities of life, as it releases energy and focuses and tranquilizes it. Even the pessimistic Schopenhauer held that "art alleviates the ills of life by showing us the eternal and universal behind the transitory and the individual." The success of a painting he held to be judged in proportion to its power to evoke in us appreciations and intimations of infinity and universality. But the end of the art of Chinese painting was neither the pessimistic view of Schopenhauer where art alleviates ills and acts as an opiate nor the hedonistic view of Epicurus, which gives only pleasure, but the view of the idealistic humanist, which enriches and ennobles life.

This will be discussed further in connection with our next principle, namely, the doctrine of the golden mean.

⁸ *A History of Chinese Painting* (concluded 845 A.D.), Chapter 1. (In Chinese); cf. Siren's translation, *The Chinese on the Art of Painting*, p. 7.

This doctrine has had both desirable and undesirable effects upon Chinese life, but our interest here is concerned with its effect upon the Chinese art, especially upon painting. First, we have to go back to the key expression of the Book of Chung Yung or the Golden Mean. It says:

While there are not stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow or joy, the mind may be said to be in a state of equilibrium. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, there ensued what may be called the state of harmony. Equilibrium is the great root from which grow all the human actions in the world, and harmony is the universal path which they all should pursue.⁹

The golden mean has been one of the outstanding aesthetic ideals because equilibrium and harmony are two essentials of every work of art whether it be a picture or a personality. Great painters of China, at their best, do not represent extreme expressions of nature. There must be restraint in freedom, hope in pessimism, and music in silence. The doctrine of the golden mean is the realization of the attempt to bring about unity of contraries: novelty is to be found in the freedom of making combinations of the conventionalities, and the master artists can express the infinite in the finite, "show the large in the small and the small in the large, and make room for the real in the unreal and for the unreal in the real." Time only permits a mention of the epistemological question: The followers of the Confucian school of thought held to an epistemological dualism in an attempt to articulate unity between the knower and the known, while those of Lao Tzu, an epistemological monism through the identity of the knower and the known. Art critics often found the problem of knowledge a stumbling block.

We have already shown that the ideal of the golden mean

⁹ *The Doctrine of the Mean*, Chapter I, section 4. Legge's translation, p. 351.

does not destroy variety, originality, nor does it eliminate unusual character. Chang Tsao, contemporary of Emperor Te Tzung (780-803 A.D.) of the Tang dynasty, often used two brushes in one hand while painting. He could produce at once two kinds of branches of trees, the living and the withered. The living branches were full of the life of spring, as if they would burst forth; the withered branches looked aged and forlorn in their autumn chill. Looking at the immediate foreground of the picture, the observer felt as if he were being pressed back; looking at the distant view, he felt the infinite, as if he were being lured forth to soar into it. Chinese scholars often on this point unconsciously joined the Taoist camp where true knowledge is the identity between the knower and the known, the beholder and the painting.

The ideal of the golden mean was achieved by various paths. For example, Ching Hao and Kuan Tung of the Five Dynasties (907-959 A.D.) made their achievements in spiritual strength through simplicity of the stroke and in marvelous suggestion of meaning through simplicity of the scenery. This was specially true of Kuan Tung's "Autumn Mountains and Shivering Groves." (*Chiu Shan Han Lin*), and of his "Rustic Village Scenes and Primitive Ferry Boats" (*Tsun Chu Yieh Tu*).

A brief analysis of the Six Canons of painting of the Chinese ought to be given, for it has long been the great guide for artists. Giles gives this following terse translation:¹⁰

1. Rhythmical vitality
2. Anatomical structure
3. Conformity with nature
4. Suitability of coloring
5. Artistic composition
6. Finish

¹⁰ *History of Chinese Pictorial Art*, p. 29.

All critics agree that the first law is of supreme importance. It is made up of four characters: (1) *Chi* literally means "air"; like the Greek "pneuma," it is spirit, made up of man's deepest and most sublime feeling. Mencius (born in 372 B.C.) once said:

One is to give good nurture to his irrepressible *élan vital*. If it (*chi*) is nourished by rectitude, it will fill up all between heaven and earth. . . . It is the mate and assistant of righteousness and reason. Without it man is in a state of starvation.¹¹

The second character is *Yun*, which means musical rhythm for which flowing harmony is essential. The third is *Sheng* or life, and the fourth is *Tung* or movement. Liu Hai Su, President of the National Institute of Fine Arts says:

These four characters which stand at the head of the Six Canons can be interpreted in various ways: they may be taken in totality; they may be taken separately, each word by itself, or two words together.¹²

But whatever view we may take, the first canon—spiritual harmony, life movement—is a summary of the philosophical implications of Chinese painting. Spiritual harmony is simply the result of the being, enriched and enobled. It is a unity of the individual and the universal, of the finite and the infinite, or the union of the *Yin* and the *Yang*. This spiritual harmony is possible only through a mystical experience, achieved by becoming one with nature. It is also the achievement of controlled and balanced activity, the root and path of universal peace and order, where human happiness is a part. Life movement implies a dynamic view of nature. It may be said to be a consequence of spiritual harmony. Every enjoyment or appreciation is a consummatory experience, but life never stands still. Scientific knowledge is power, but power over one particular object;

¹¹ The works of Mencius, Chapter II, sections 11, 14.

¹² *A Discourse on the Six Canons of the Art of Chinese Painting*, pp. 23-24.

spiritual harmony is power that tranquilizes and yet leads on. Through the art of painting a new "garden" or a new "space" is created for the human feeling and mind to grow in, because the painting of the artist-philosopher or the philosopher-artist must set free the superficial covering of material form and articulate the rich inner life of the object in harmony with the artist's own soul.

In conclusion, the Chinese conception of beauty may serve as the gist of the philosophical background of Chinese painting. The word for Beauty (*Mei*) and the word for Goodness (*Shan*) have a strange and common root. It is the radical for "lamb" or "sheep" (*Yang*). Beauty is a fat lamb, full of life and satisfied. A lamb and "speaking" combined signify humility and gratitude, which to the Chinese means goodness. We see then that goodness and beauty had their common root in the word "lamb." A lamb or a sheep is a homely creature, used mostly for material purposes, but the characters took on spiritual meanings of inner humility and gratitude on one hand, and of life and satisfaction on the other. To understand how beauty and goodness have been united is to understand Chinese art and culture. Chiang Yee, one of our contemporary scholar-artists has recently written:

The foundation-stones of Art are similar all over the world, but the fabric of the buildings that rise up over them differs in design and fashioning: Chinese Mountain-Temple and Gothic Cathedral of the West, — on what ground do they meet? Buddha built the one and Christ the other. The course our painting has followed in China, in contrast with yours in Europe, can only be ascribed to our traditional philosophy.¹³

¹³ *Chinese Eye*, p. 86. (Methuen & Co., London, 1935.)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF POETRY

By WILLIAM HESTER

OVER and beyond any amount of theory it may have, every major realm of our activity has a philosophy as well; and though at times difficult to separate in an actual experience, the two are logically distinct. With regard to any field, theory may be functionally defined as concerned with the establishment of general rules for practice, and philosophy as devoted to the exposition of universal principles of being implicit in the nature of the field.¹ Thus the philosophy of a subject is only its essence made articulate. Being conditioned solely by the meaning it affirms, it is both *a priori* and absolute. The purpose of the philosophy of poetry is to bring forth from the unformulated or the unaware those universal and necessary principles which underlie poetry as one of the fine arts. These are, so to speak, the axiomatics of poetry. Though it is not possible to deal with them in the logically precise fashion of such a science as mathematics, they do not for that reason lose either their validity or their rigor. Some things can be said of poetry which in no way depend upon particular theories of poetry, but merely upon that entity which the word "poetry" signifies. These things constitute the philosophy of poetry; and it is because of this fact that although there are many different theories of poetry, there can be only one philosophy of poetry in the true sense—so long as the terms remain the same in human language.

Considered in its externality, poetry is first of all an art. Of the numerous and varied definitions given for Art, the one most to the point seems to me to be that of Delsarte,

¹ Of course, what is philosophy in one connection may be merely theory in regard to another, as one interpretation presupposes and depends on a higher; *e. g.*, *cf.* Poe's "Philosophy of Composition."

namely that Art is *emotion passed through thought and fixed in form*. This definition has the virtue of being at once objective, literal, and specifically true to music, painting, poetry, sculpture, and the rest. Due to the nature of the medium employed in each art, the three elements of *emotion*, *thought*, and *form*, though always present, vary in proportionate emphasis among the arts. In music, on the one hand, the element of emotion is preponderant: for that reason music has supreme sway over our feelings, seeming to touch us most directly at the very heart of inner sentience. In music the emotion is passed so immediately into the form which expresses it that it may almost be said to have absorbed the form and become indistinguishable from it. Yet even here the interfacial element of thought is not completely lost, though suppressed. This is seen in the fact that while an idea may not be discernible so that we are conscious of it in appreciating music, the influence of its presence prevents contrary ideas from being imposed in its place. This apophatic criterion alone demonstrates its existence. But in painting and sculpture, on the other hand, it is the form which is dominant, and which to an extent absorbs the emotion. In extreme cases, for example among highly modernistic works, the emotion is abstractly crystalized in color patterns or mere geometric shapes. But here too, even as in music, the thought-element is similarly present and discoverable.

Between music and painting lies poetry, whose primary element is thought. Thought is so eminently characteristic and distinctive of poetry that it is frequently spoken of as belonging to poetry alone, though this is properly so only by comparison. In any work of art the trio of emotion, thought, and form are fully present; and to say that they figure most prominently in music, poetry, and painting (or sculpture) respectively is true only when each art is taken in its

purity. Insofar as a creative work emphasizes one or other of these three, it is to that degree within the sphere native to the element. To illustrate: in music we have the symphonic poem, or program music; in painting, the narrative mural or panel; and in sculpture, the frieze—all more or less telling a story or embodying in some way an overt and definite thought, and all akin to poetry in spirit. Conversely, in poetry too there are neighboring variants: song and description. Song, primarily concerned with expressing some mood or emotion and having only enough intellectual content to give it articulation, is very close to music—so close, in fact, that the title “song” is interchangeably used in both fields; while description, which merely presents a scene, or photographs an event (although in the aura of a valuing attitude), is little else than a picture painted in words instead of in pigments. The fact that poetry employs as its medium words instead of sounds, colors, or shapes naturally insures it more intellectuality than the other arts, for in addition to tonal quality, shade and form (which they also have) words possess a denotation underneath.

Centered thus between the temporal and the spatial arts, and having in so large a measure the features of both of them as well as its own, poetry displays most nearly the concrete image of Art itself. For this, it ranks as greatest of the arts, although music, through its instantaneous direct appeal, stands higher in “pure” quality. The power of music is intense but momentary, that of poetry less strong but more extensive and enduring.

Both for reason of its comprehensiveness, therefore, as well as because it deals especially with thought, poetry may be described as the philosophic art. Since the thought in poetry, as in other arts, is in universals rather than in particulars, “philosophic” here means rather having a catholic reference than applying merely to technical philosophy. All

poetry is philosophic in this sense.² Since poetry is defined only as the art whose medium is language, the term broadly includes "prose" as well. For there is no essential difference between verse and prose literature except in degree. Poetry is more concrete and compact, more intensely art. Its higher virtue is, as Voltaire suggests, economy: "One merit of poetry few persons will deny; it says more, in fewer words, than prose." This superior economy manifests itself in two ways: 1. with regard to content, it makes poetry more suggestive, subtle, and careful than prose; and 2. with regard to form, it makes poetry more structural and patterned, and gives it more definite and regular rhythm than prose. It cannot be denied that prose has its rhythms (any more than that it has its suggestiveness), but they are so broad and varied that the ear cannot hear them as metre, and so the specific melodic effect is lost. No sharp and fast separation, however, can be made between the two, and there are any number of literary types vaguely hybrid. In speaking of the fine arts, the title poetry is commonly used to cover both forms as a generic name: "the popular division into prose and verse," said Shelley, "is inadmissible into accurate philosophy." In the manner of degree indicated, therefore, what is true of poetry is in general true of literature as a whole.

But having spoken of poetry as the philosophic art, there remains the matter of determining the adjective here, and of relating it to philosophy proper. Far from being considered as intimately connected, poetry and philosophy have frequently been put in opposition as irreconcilables. "Philosophy will clip an angel's wings," cried Keats. The real difference between poetry and philosophy, however, is not that between an Ariel fancy and Caliban fact, but more in

² All Art, indeed, is characterized by such a universal signification; but in poetry alone is the reference intellectual enough to be strictly termed "philosophic."

their manner of approach to the world which is their common property. Poetry as well as philosophy is built upon wonder. Their difference as well as their similarity is expressed in the double sense of the word: the "wonder" in philosophy is merely intellectual; in poetry it is emotional as well. The attempt of philosophy is to present the world to the mind; the purpose of poetry is to awaken it in the heart. Philosophy speaks to reason through the speech of intelligence, poetry to instinct³ through the idiom of intuition. Its aim is not merely to convey the idea, but to convey it in such a manner that the original emotion surrounding and coloring it with meaning is retained unaltered in the delivery. The reader is made to feel an emotional wonder, the sense of original discovery that Keats told of in his experience with Homer:

Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken;
Or like stout Cortez when with eagle eyes
He stared at the Pacific — and all his men
Looked at each other with a wild surmise —
Silent, upon a peak in Darien.⁴

Much talk has been made about "poetic truth" as distinguished from "scientific truth," and the former has been defended as the natural resource of art, quite outside the province and factual limitations either of logic, ordinary life, or history. The fictions have even been held to exhibit a higher truth-value than the nature they represent (and alter) or the empirical evidence that opposes them. Such an account is more in keeping with the spirit of art than with the literal event. Other than in accidental or ornamental fashion, poetry is not concerned with truth at all, but with reality—a reality. With the coherence or correspondence of objects (mental, physical, or otherwise) in our experience, poetry has no interest; whether or not an object is "true" in

³ In the common sense of an immediate affective disposition.

⁴ Keats, John, "On First Looking Into Chapman's Homer."

any epistemological way whatsoever, or by any criterion, is a matter of no importance to Art. What is important to Art (and poetry, in particular, faces the question explicitly) is that the object is *real*, i. e., true to *us* in our own experience under the form in which it is presented. "All things exist as they are perceived: at least in relation to the percipient."⁸ We ourselves act as touchstone for reality: that is real whose being we perceive to possess the same degree of existence as our own. It is a commonplace, of course, to say that we (the criterion) are constantly changing, growing, passing from this to that, from one state to its contrary, *etc.*—but it is this very commonplace fact that allows us so complex an experience, so various a world, so composite a reality. Our reflective judgment may deem some of the objects of experience (or their subjective presence in us) as illusion and error, to be understood and accounted for only in a larger whole; but—and the fact remains despite all schooled survey—these objects, these elements of experience, lose none of their immediate reality and significance to us however momentary the act of their occurrence. That is to say, in spite of time or tide or dialectic they are *real*, whether true or not: their dependence, solely as being what they are, is not among themselves but in each case individually and radially upon us. The world of these objects (perhaps illusive or unrectified) is the boundless realm of Art. It is the end of poetry as the preëminently conscious, philosophic art so to present the world *in portion*, or from a single angle, that in a direct and luminous moment we are brought to recognize our identity with it at that point, i. e., the equal presence in us and in it of something ultimately important. That identity, that realization, is the sole "truth" that is to be "carried alive into the heart"; with other truths poetry *as such* has no deliberate concern.

⁸ Shelley, *A Defense of Poetry*.

Hence, as would be expected, contradictions are unimportant. Two more opposing viewpoints could hardly be imagined than those shown in the familiar lines—

Life is real, life is earnest,
And the grave is not its goal

and

Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more; it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.

These are both universal propositions, and without qualification they cannot both be true in any rational manner—nor of course are they meant to be. The point is that both are real: their appeal is directed not to reason but to the whole personality. The richness of ordinary personal experience inevitably gives both of these attitudes the unmistakable force of oracle, so that we *know* their reality: they are real feelings at one time or another, regardless of what we may soberly think on the subject.

The scope of poetry, not being confined to systemic truth, is thus as wide as possible experience. Similarly its themes, the occasions of experience, are in no way predetermined: there is no such thing as a topic in itself unsuitable for poetry. The question of fitness lies rather with the author, and depends upon whether he can in treating the topic give it the one essential property—an infinite meaningfulness, a revelatory wonder. The more nearly this is fulfilled, the greater the work of art. This is the philosophy which is *in* poetry, as distinct from the philosophy *of* poetry as well as from the technical science by that name. The wealth of meaning in poetry lies in the so called “cosmic overtones” evoked by its ideas, not necessarily in problems. A work may be extremely opulent in thought and yet have but a slight theme, for even the greatest themes may be in them-

selves intellectually simple. It is the power of poetry to take such themes and by playing upon them with the flare of the imagination to cast its countless lights and insights into the darknesses of the world, "fading off into horizons too swift for explanations." In this sense, Amy Lowell's "Patterns" is as philosophic as Thomas Hardy's "Hap," or Robert Frost's "Fire and Ice" as Horace's "*Carpe Diem*."

In observing these innate conditions, there are necessarily three moments in every piece of poetry: 1. *material situation*, the particular subject matter of person, place, thing, or event from which the impulse of the poem arises; 2. *universality*, the higher region of meaning, the reality which gives significance to the subject as a symbol of something beyond itself; 3. *concrete expression*, the embodiment of this reality in definite artistic form.

The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to
 heaven;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.

This dialectic, passing upward from the particular to the abstract universal and then down again to the concrete, constitutes the complete framework for poetry. The first step, the ascension, is wholly philosophic; and the second, the descension, purely artistic. Both of these are unconditionally required. Sometimes, however, the ascension is only latent in the poem, having its fulfillment largely outside (in the reason or inspiration of the poem), but being understood as presumed in the work itself.^o It is because of this that the word "poetry" is especially or exclusively applied in casual discourse to the descension, where a universal is caught in an image. Strictly speaking, it is only when

^o e. g. in "*Vitae Summa Brevis*," by Ernest Dowson.

both elements are present (either patently or by implication) that poetry is complete, for without the first the poem is artistically unmotivated and becomes baldly didactic or expository. This applies in like manner to a whole poem or simply to isolated passages.

A poem in which the three stages of material situation, universality, and concrete expression are completely explicit in order of time as well as in logic is Matthew Arnold's "Dover Beach." From the local scene—the calm, moonlit night, the waves sounding on the shore and then receding—comes the association

Sophocles long ago
Heard it on the Aegean, and it brought
Into his mind the turbid ebb and flow
Of human misery; we
Find also in the sound a thought,
Hearing it by this distant northern sea.

The sea becomes a symbol of the "sea of faith," once at the full but now gone out, leaving only its "melancholy long, withdrawing roar" which brings "the eternal note of sadness in." And then this universal finds answer in the concrete, and reality is brought to a sharp focus on the moment:

Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain,
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.

Other poems in which the three stages are as freely apparent as in this are to be met with everywhere, for example in Blake's "The Fly," Keat's "Ode on a Grecian Urn," Browning's "Abt Vogler," Anacreon's "Age," or even "The Rose" of Goethe.

In addition to their general occurrence throughout any

part of a whole, the three elements of art (emotion, thought, form) have also, in varying degrees of plainness, a lateral correspondence with the three necessary moments found in poetry. It is the material situation that gives the emotional impetus or initial force which lifts thought to universality, and then passes through it to be expressed in concrete form.

From the question of content comes at once the question of style, for the emotional wonder which poetry communicates proceeds not out of the conception underlying the poem but from the manner of presentation. Through long centuries of human speculation and observation most of the surprise has been worn off of ideas in philosophy. The factor of original discovery, then, must emanate from the expression. From it must be created the illusion of novelty, so that the old is made to seem new and to delight by its freshness. This is accomplished in two ways, by modifying the thought and modifying the language. Both methods are employed, either separately or together, in order to achieve suggestiveness. Stories are varied, plots implicated, psychological dilemmas created; thus balance, and hence suspense, and hence interest is brought about. Meanings are not told directly, but only hinted at, so that there is a certain amount of imaginative effort prescribed to grasp them. Hence, particularly in the concentrated form of lyric verse, the use of metaphor, allegory, symbolism, and allusion is frequent. The bridging of the gap from the given to the inferred contributes the obstacle required to exhilarate the fancy toward apprehending the thought emotionally. To illustrate on a minor scale: in the lines of A. E. Housman, for instance,

Life, to be sure, is nothing much to lose,

But young men think it is, and we were young

the thought is deliberately delayed, and we are forced to work around to it; we ourselves discover the conclusion by completing the syllogism. If apt and complete alone, odd or

even fantastic associations of ideas serve to arouse the response. Modification of language through neologistic, obscure, or unusual wording gives rise to suggestiveness in easy fashion, but this method runs a risk in being liable to the ravages of time. What is considered clever or sophisticated phrasing at the moment of writing may tomorrow pass so completely into the currency of everyday speech that any special effectiveness is lost. Even so, only in so far as triteness has actually affected language and taken away or petrified some idiom or phrase does its familiarity preclude it from poetry. Clichés, as they are called, are not in themselves categorically ruled out. Similarly, on a more elaborate scale, the language of poetry is not apodeictically confined to that of any era, whether contemporaneous or prior; as art requires, it may be either modern or archaic. Its historical position is external and accidental, and it is aside from and independent of the customs of the day. These customs it may or not may not adopt, as occasion warrants.

Out of deference to some particular ideal in art, it may be permissible for a theory to establish precepts governing matters of theme or topic, but in so doing, the theory remains opinion only, granting the existence of contrary opinion. To ordain the principles of poetry on the whole as to subject or treatment, form or content, is not within the jurisdiction of theory, but belongs to the philosophy of poetry; and the philosophy of poetry does not legislate—it merely deduces, explicates. Its canons are absolute and *a priori* because it says so little, and confines itself to noting limitations rather than preferences, unalterable indicatives rather than positive, practical determinants; which is to say, figuratively, that the philosophy of poetry is a mere definition, not a manual of (even theoretical) composition. It treats of poetry, consequently, as unconditionally as unconditioned.

Once composed, and considered intrinsically rather than genetically, poetry is absolute. It is *relational*, but not *relative*, depending upon the relationship of man to the world in the universal and unchanging aspects of both.

From the historical independence of poetry there follows a corollary independence from its creators. The life of a work of art, when finished, is utterly separate from that of the artist. Its being a work of art depends on its universality, and its universality depends on its objectivity as a creation. There is no such thing as "private meaning" in poetry. If there be any private meaning of the author present, it is there only in the same way as dust upon the written page. The emotion, the thought, and the form belong wholly to the work itself. It is an object glorified, but alone; even its "subjectivity" has to be objective in the Kantian sense, and have its "life in the poem and not in the history of the poet."⁷ The poetry may have originated in an experience of the poet or it may rely on the possible experience of the reader, but one thing it must do—have its own "experience" within itself, perfect and apart.

The absoluteness of poetry, then, cannot be a debatable matter of opinion. It is involved in the mere being of poetry. In spite of T. S. Eliot's "changing tradition" or Oswald Spengler's "cultural cycle," poetry therefore affords a few permanent, though general, standards by which literary criticism can be at least begun. It is the function of the aesthete to work out these principles in the particular detail which only a laboratory knowledge of the subject gives. It is the business of the critic, aside from any rôle of interpreter, first to accommodate by taste and then to apply these ideals in evaluation.

⁷ T. S. Eliot, *After Strange Gods*.

CURRENT THOUGHT

The April, 1939, issue of *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* is devoted to a history and exposition of *Le Réalisme Anglo-Saxon*. Three of the four articles are contributed by American philosophers: Ralph Barton Perry writes on "American Philosophy in the First Decade of the Twentieth Century"; William Pepperell Montague on "*L'histoire du réalisme américain*"; and Roy Wood Sellars on "A Statement of Critical Realism." All three articles are particularly significant for understanding something of the rise, development, variations and present status of Realism in America.

Professor Perry's account of the shift of emphasis in both European and American philosophy back in the late nineties is not only informing as to the new trends of thought just taking form, but also comprises valuable historical data not commonly at hand. As a sign of the times Professor Perry says:

In 1899 seniors in Williams College were given the option of taking a course on "Theism" given by the Rev. . . ., D.D., aged sixty-two, and a course in the "History of Philosophy," given in the next room by . . . , Ph.D., aged twenty-one (432).

According to the writer, three problems were uppermost. First, conflict occurred over the role of the intellect in knowledge. The intellectualism of Idealism was challenged by pragmatists and instrumentalists. Second, opinion was divided on the metaphysical role of mind, consciousness, or the moral will. Idealists incorporated the non-mental in the mental, while Realists extended reality beyond mind. The third difference pertained to the doctrine of the "Absolute," which the Realists, of course, rejected. In the place of traditional Idealism, three tendencies occurred in the first decade of the twentieth century; neo-positivism, the naturalistic interpretation of experience, and a new branch of knowledge—the theory of value.

Professor Montague approaches the consideration of American Realism from a broader historical view. After presenting the antecedents of Realism and recounting the revolt of the pragmatists from Idealism, he outlines the program of the Neo-Realists which was presented in 1910 by six philosophers. In this collaboration the attempt was made to follow the method of science; external objects and essences or universals were held to be independent of their being perceived; and it was contended that particular objects as well as universals were apprehended directly. After presenting the relation of Neo-Realism to Idealism and Pragmatism, Professor Montague then recounts the errors of the Neo-Realists with respect to Behaviorism and to Objective Relativism. The inability of the Neo-Realists to deal satisfactorily with these errors occasioned the rise of Critical

Realism. Therefore in 1920 a second group of seven men collaborated in *Essays in Critical Realism*. The argument still centered around the epistemological problem. The Neo-Realists had been "presentationists," i.e., they had held that physical existents are as immediately present to the perceiving subject as are logical existents to thought. The Critical Realists, however, rejected this view and held that knowledge of extramental reality is comprised of three terms—the mind, the object, and the datum. Professor Montague says:

This theory may be true but it certainly is not new. It is, in effect, a revival of epistemological dualism which is explicit in Locke and Descartes, and implicit in Hobbes, Spinoza, and other modern philosophers before Berkeley (465).

The case for Critical Realism is presented by Professor Sellars. According to him, *New Realism*, in its determination to avoid subjectivism was compelled also to renounce "representationalism"—what Professor Sellars evidently means by "denotation and characterization." Critical Realism seeks to correct the shortcoming of *New Realism* by recognizing the part played by sensory experience in the "interpreted complex" of the perceptual situation. Here immanence and transcendence are introduced. The writer identifies immanence with intuition, as employed by Neo-Realists, while transcendence goes beyond what may be intuited to what can only be "believed in and noted" (480). This epistemological use of transcendence should not be confused with its metaphysical application. In Professor Sellars' explanation, transcendence relates to "denotative characterization." Moreover, "consciousness is an intrinsic feature of a mind-brain state" (493), and exists "on the inside of a physical system. . . . Our conscious minds never overlap the stimulated and functioning organism" (493). And in a closing statement Professor Sellars adds:

It can be seen that critical realism is essentially a clarification of naive realism through the development of the distinction between intuition and denotative characterization (496).

Realism has done a service to philosophy in its attempt to clarify the philosophic atmosphere and to purge thought of extraneous and unhealthy symptoms. As a method it is vigorous, but when devoted to naturalistic metaphysics it runs into an impossible impasse. As such, as Professor Montague argues, it is not new but revives, in modern dress, the barren skeleton of materialism and naturalism whose vogue has been out of keeping with their logic and value. Their practicality has netted them returns beyond their fruitfulness to the greater issues of life. Something needs to be added as a goal of which Realism may furnish the method. Personal Realism is suggestive.

Paul R. Helsel.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

The Irony of Sophocles

Throughout the development of literature designed for the theatre, the use of tragic irony has been a favorite device. Its introduction ordinarily suggests the imminence of disaster or calamity. The words of the actors may appear to be perfectly natural in the situation, yet they are a sinister expression to those the dramatist ordains as privileged. Greek writers introduced and made more use of tragic irony than do modern dramatists. The character of the Greek drama made the use of irony highly effective; legendary myths, source-book for the Greeks, lent themselves readily to ambiguous phrases. The modern drama in its "new" psychological setting does not lend itself to this kind of situation so easily. Because Sophocles used this method so extensively it has become proverbial to speak of it as "Sophocles' Irony."

Sophocles remains supreme in the direction of this marvelous power to influence emotion. It is not in occasional scenes and sparse passages only that he makes use of what is his almost unique contribution, but it may be the theme of a whole drama, as in *Trachiniae* and *Oedipus Rex*. The latter play, the most completely typical of Greek tragedy, and the masterpiece of Sophocles, contains the best example of tragic irony. The irony which *Nemesis* commands is here portrayed with unexcelled effectiveness. After Oedipus fled Corinth he killed his father, the king, unknowingly, went to Thebes and solved the riddle of the Sphinx, married the queen, became king, and had children. As the play opens, irony early presents itself as the priest addresses Oedipus as "the wisest of men dealing with life's chances and with the visitations of heaven." Such a statement excites in the forewarned audience a mounting pity for Oedipus, he who is unconscious of his approaching fate. Consider these situations: Oedipus insists that the search for the assassin is "not on behalf of strangers, but in his own cause." And the most tragic: Oedipus condemns himself and brings down upon himself his own dreadful sentence as he curses the murder of Laius.

As for the man who did the deed of guilt, whether alone he lurks, or in league with others, I pray that he may waste his life away in suffering, perishing vilely for his vile actions. And if he should become a dweller in my house, I knowing it, may every curse I utter fall on my own head.

If in this place men there be
Who know and speak not, lo, I make decree
That, while in Thebes I bear the diadem,
No man shall greet, no man shall shelter them,
Nor give them water in their thirst, nor share
In sacrifice nor shrift nor dying prayer,
But thrust them from our doors, the thing they hide
Being this land's curse.¹

¹ 247-253.

In the midst of a glorious reign the revelation of his sins takes place. Immediately his dearly beloved children become the fruit of incest; the glory of his reign, his personal honor, the greatness of Thebes, are all revolting and abominable. Oedipus' glance is retrospective; but what of the Gods who are prospective? Sophocles never attempts to analyze their thoughts, perhaps because he had less faith in the Gods, perhaps because he thought they were unknowable. The spectator, the third party to the irony, is aroused, eager and mobile.

According to Aristotle, any tragedy to be worthy must arouse the emotions of pity and fear to the extent of producing a catharsis. Sophocles excels the standard. Through his use of irony he has aroused men down the ages to a realization of their woeful ignorance and to endeavor after the truth.

Schuyler Dean Hoslett.

In the last issue of *The Personalist*, an announcement was made of the early appearance of the new *Journal of the History of Ideas*. Volume I is to appear in January, 1940, and will contain seventeen leading articles on a wide variety of subjects by philosophers, historians, scientists and others. Brief accounts of new books will be added. If the brochure is indicative, the periodical will deserve a rightful place in the realm of thought and culture. Communications may be addressed to the Managing Editor, Journal of the History of Ideas, College of the City of New York, Convent Avenue and 139th Street, New York City.

The first volume of *Philosophical Abstracts* has made its appearance. Its scope is world-wide, as it contains one hundred and seventy brief digests of books from twelve different nations and announcements of new books from fourteen different countries. Certainly acquaintance with such an array of material as appears from time to time will not only disseminate the knowledge of what different countries are producing but will also tend to give a sense of unity to widely scattered and diverse undertakings. For further information, address Philosophic Abstracts, 884 Riverside Drive, New York City.

The Mahlon Powell Lectures were delivered this year by President Emeritus William Lowe Bryan on the general topic: Wars of Families of Minds. Three special subjects were discussed: The Scholar and the Unschooled Man, Scholar against Scholar, and Scholar and Poet. The lectures will be published by the department of philosophy of Indiana University and may be had by addressing the University at Bloomington, Indiana.

The *Journal of Social Philosophy* announces a special number which includes articles by Charles Beard, M. C. Otto and John

Dewey in addition to others of equal importance. The *Journal of Social Philosophy* is published by the College of the City of New York, New York City.

The summer, 1939 edition of *Luminar*, a quarterly magazine published in Mexico City, and sympathetic to the philosophy of Personalism, gives in full the annual address of Ralph Tyler Flewelling, President of the Pacific Coast Division of the American Philosophical Association, 1938, that was delivered at Berkeley, California, last Demember. The subject of the address was, "Three Windows Into Reality." This address also received a summary statement by Professor G. Dawes Hicks in the October, 1939, *Hibbert Journal*, under the section "Survey of Recent Philosophical Literature." The same issue of *Luminar* referred to above also has a half-page digest of Professor Emmanuel Mounier's article "Observations on the Tradition of French Personalism," that appeared in the summer, 1939, issue of *The Personalist*. In addition the *Luminar* promises its readers in a future number the article by Professor Wilbur Long on "Mr. Dewey's Faith Without Religion" which was published in two numbers of *The Personalist*, Summer and Autumn, 1937.

One of the new, recent exchanges of *The Personalist* is *The Journal of Liberal Religion*. Its dedicatory statement is "to encourage creative, scholarly writing by Unitarians and Universalists." It is a magazine of forty-eight pages at present and in addition to leading articles, it has a section entitled "The Chronicle" in which current points of view are discussed. It expects to conduct a department also for the review of new books. Those interested may address the Editor at 5701 Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

An embarrassing error was made in the last issue of *The Personalist* on Our Contributor's Page with reference to the identity of Saburo Imai, who furnished the article entitled "A New Japanese Spirit and Christianity." Instead of what was mentioned there, the following should have been said: Dr. Imai graduated from the Pacific School of Religion more than twenty-five years ago. He has served as pastor of one of the large Methodist churches in Tokyo and is known as a foremost Christian leader of Japan. Also Dr. Imai is the author of a number of influential books and represented Christianity in the notable conference on Education called by the Japanese government. In 1937 he was awarded the degree of Doctor of Divinity by his *Alma Mater*.

Along the Bookshelf

What is History?

THE HISTORY OF HISTORY. Volume I. By James T. Shotwell. Columbia University Press, New York. Pp. xii, 407. \$3.75.

Is history a record of events or the events themselves, or is it a human process in which the facts of history and the lives of historic personages do not exist by themselves but only as a part of the process? These are the suggestions with which Professor Shotwell begins the first volume of his work on *The History of History*. What further is relatively important in the determination of history? Is it, as now so popularly assumed, the economic need or is it the power of ideas? Of this the author tells us we may be certain: history is more than events. It is the manifestation of life, and behind each event is some effort of mind and will, while within each circumstance exists some power to stimulate or obstruct (15). Thus it may be seen that history and interpretation are one. But what is to hinder such interpretation from dropping into mere myth mongering, the uncritical acceptance of interpretive imagination? It is only the determination to doubt, to question the results of the myth-making process.

In a chapter on pre-history, myth, and legend, the author shows how treacherous is the method by which we scientifically attempt to reconstruct the history of the past out of too scanty information and in absence of a knowledge of the spirit and ideology of the times under review. Such schemes he declares to be not history but speculation. And

yet a great deal now passes as history which is the barest speculation based upon some unproved and even unprovable hypothesis.

After discussing books as the medium of history and time as its essential framework, Professor Shotwell sets forth the development of historical writing beginning with Egypt and continuing through Babylonian, Assyrian, Persian, Jewish, Greek and Roman contributions. He points out the hindrance to true historical writing of acceptance of recorded history as divine revelation. Yet he pays tribute to those philosophies of history that characterized portions of the Old Testament, of the writings of Paul, Origen, and Augustine, and gives them a real place as having historical value.

Roman history he points out is dominated by myth, an attempt largely to fit early happenings in the Roman national life into the larger framework of Greek origins. The new era of historic writing comes in general with the appearance of Christianity though neither Christian nor Jewish thought can be considered as affecting the course of Roman history.

Professor Shotwell's book might profitably be read in conjunction with Croce's work *On History*, though for critical analysis and scientific acumen it may be held superior to the latter. In no field has there been greater need of clarification than in this. Volume one of *The History of History* gives promise of a completed work which will be a requisite for all historians and historical libraries. R. T. F.

Philosophy and the Humanities

A HUNDRED YEARS OF BRITISH PHILOSOPHY. By *Rudolf Metz*. Translated by *J. W. Harvey, T. E. Jessop,* and *Henry Sturt*. Edited by *J. H. Muirhead*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. 828. \$7.00.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACT. By *George Herbert Mead*; edited, with introduction, by *Charles W. Morris, John M. Brewster, Albert M. Dunham,* and *David L. Miller*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois. Pp. lxxxiv, 696. \$5.00.

THE MEANING OF THE HUMANITIES. Five Essays by *Ralph Barton Perry, August Charles Krey, Erwin Panofsky, Robert Lowry Calhoun,* and *Gilbert Chinard*; edited by *Theodore Meyer Greene*. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Pp. xxxix, 178. \$2.50.

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By *Joseph B. Burgess*. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York. Pp. xi, 631. \$3.25.

OUTLINE OF PHILOSOPHY. Students Outline Series. By *John Edward Bentley*, Ph.D. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. Pp. iv, 158.

LA STORIA COME PENSIERO E COME AZIONE. By *Benedetto Croce*. Bari: G. Laterza. Pp. vii, 329. 30 lira, cloth 42 lira.

REASON. Lectures Delivered Before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, 1938. Editors, *George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg, Stephen C. Pepper*. University of California Press. Berkeley, California. Pp. 228. \$2.25.

In 1935 Dr. Rudolf Metz published a two-volume work entitled *Die philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien*. This study on British thought from Thomas Reid to the present, was so thoroughly and brilliantly accomplished that in spite of formidable obstacles involved the Library of Philosophy has recently offered it to the English-speaking world. *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, the title of the translated edition, is a noteworthy and sound piece of historical and critical scholarship. Consequently its publication is an event of first importance. Dr. Metz has brought

to his task, and a task greatly in need of doing, unrivalled powers of summarization and characterization, and a style that is always clear, incisive, interesting, and even brilliant. One picks up the volume with the expectation of floundering in the heavy Teutonic idiom popular since Kant, only to find himself enjoying a writing that is colorful, clean, and enticing. The author's powers of appraisal are remarkable, and his estimates are sound. One of the notable features of the work is his fine sense of appreciation of minds of all types and representing all realms of conviction.

His apt characterizations are at times classic. Of A. E. Taylor's about-face in metaphysics he remarks: "Once more Saul has become Paul" (423). Of S. S. Laurie's idiom of thought and expression he observes: "He was as gnarled and severe as the visage of his own land" (430). "Modern Pragmatism," we are told, "is like a surface painted in many iridescent colours" (447). Of Shadworth Hodgson's work: "The broad cemetery of the history of philosophy has received it and assigned it an honourable resting-place" (483). With reference to the highly analytic and cryptic method of E. G. Moore, he suggests that "Evidently this kind of philosophizing is eminently liable to be sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought and gnawed by the tooth of scepticism" (541). And on the following page, "The best term to describe Moore's method of thought is 'microscopic,' in contrast to the telescopic method of the Hegelians."

Dr. Metz's apt and terse way of summing up a man may be appreciated by noting his powers of characterization turned upon

two of the liveliest figures in modern British speculative circles. Here is a snip from his analysis of Bradley:

That Bradley was an extremely independent thinker, indeed a capricious and obstinate one . . . is evident in every line he wrote, in the pithiness and ruggedness of his style, in his rough and almost brutal way of disposing of his opponents, and in the way he composed his books, which give the impression not of a calm, objective, and precise presentation but of a soliloquy, or an unrestrained conversation with the reader, sometimes perfectly simple and straightforward, sometimes broken with dry and blunt or caustic wit, grotesque and ironical asides, splenetic sallies, and derision of his opponents or of himself. He loved paradox, preferred the uncommon, moved among opposites and rejoiced in contradictions, soared high but rarely let his feet leave the solid earth, was a sophist, sceptic, dogmatist and mystic all in one. Hence his philosophy had all the variety and iridescence of life itself, and its elusiveness too, so that any reproduction of it can scarcely retain its peculiar consistency and flavour (324).

Turning to Bradley's philosophic gad-fly, Schiller, we find the following estimate:

As a natural fighter he was always ready for action, always ready to deal blows on all sides. Sometimes he carried the attack into the enemy's camp, sometimes he retreated to a defensive position, sometimes he stepped

into the arena with a new offensive. He had complete command of all the weapons which are needed for conflict — of repartee, nimbleness, and intrepidity, of ridicule and irony, wit and humour, of brilliant diction and acute dialectic. Among contemporary British philosophers he was the controversialist *par excellence*, the most agile fighter, the best and liveliest writer. To Schiller philosophy is not a matter of learning, or one which is reached by self-searching or shock-tactics, or the satisfaction of theoretic, aesthetic or such-like needs; it was the expression and outpouring of a fresh and free personality; it was more a sport or game than learning, research, or profession of faith (453-4).

This volume provokes enthusiasm not only for its proof of high and sympathetic scholarship, but because once again definitive erudition has crossed national and linguistic boundary lines. The only criticism that comes to mind is the author's assumption that eclectic thought is incapable of a genuine synthesis, and must remain a mere "conglomerate." This charge, laid at the door of Wildon Carr, for instance (433), seems at times unwarranted. Some minor slip-ups are unavoidable in a work of this magnitude. For instance, the statement that Schiller merely made "some excursions" to America is incorrect in implication. For ten years he was professor in the School of Philosophy, University of Southern California, and during the final years of his life he was married and maintained a permanent household in Los Angeles.

Now that Dr. Metz has applied his genius to a needed review of recent and contemporary British thought, perhaps he might be persuaded to make accessible to English-speaking peoples a second work on "A Hundred Years of German Philosophy."

Incidentally, the translation is excellent, and J. W. Harvey, T. E. Jessop, and Henry Sturt, to whom we are indebted for the English edition, are deserving of our thanks. They have not only given generously of their time to make it possible, but they have as well done a splendid job of it.

The bewilderment, misunderstanding, and puzzlement that have dogged the pragmatic movement ever since its beginning in Peirce and James have remained with compound interest in the Instrumentalist movement wherein Dewey, its renowned head, has been ably seconded by the late George Herbert Mead of Chicago University. These characteristic features of pragmatic writing are not absent from Mead's *The Philosophy of the Act*, the last of three works comprising his unpublished and uncollected writings. Its contents are grouped under five sections dealing with "General analysis of knowledge and the act;" "Perceptual and manipulatory phases of the act;" "Cosmology;" "Value and the Act;" and a concluding group of fragments. Mead's general viewpoint is said to be naturalistic, and the underlying categories of his cosmology, in the words of the editors in an extensive introduction, are "Evolution, emergence, dynamics, process, and sociality."

I gather, although perhaps this is a misinterpretation, that Mead holds that the *physis* or primordial stuff of reality is pure experience. Within this

matrix finite centers emerge and separate out from their neutral environment of undifferentiated pure experience. By interaction with it and with one another arise responses, and where these are blocked consciousness and intelligence may emerge. Thought, however, is a function of words; by mimicry in using the words of others, individuals come to be conscious of the social character of things: they discover themselves and their social environment by adopting the role and attitudes of others under the inspiration of verbal echoing. The stage is now set for Mind to emerge, and with it emerges the World as known. Organisms, acts, Nature, perspectives, concepts, scientific objects, values—all these emerge in (or out of or in relation to) the Act.

The best condensed summary of Mead's viewpoint is that given by the editors in the introduction:

... the philosophy of mind arises through a consideration of the manner in which the symbolical and the subjective arise as a stage in the reconstruction of the act; the philosophy of science is concerned with the genesis of scientific categories within the act and the relation of the world as presented by science to the world of common perception and the demands of action; metaphysics ... can be only the most general description of the world as it reveals itself in increasingly comprehensive social acts; axiology is grounded on a consideration of the consummatory or value phase of the act, the aesthetic being the penetration of consummation into early stages of the act, while the moral

is the endeavor to achieve the maximum of value at the level of the social; education philosophically considered is seen as the process of internalizing the social act within the separate individuals and creating in them social interests; the philosophy of history is revealed as a consideration of the methods by which societies have sought to control themselves and their environments in the service of their basic needs and impulses; and the philosophy of religion is transformed into an empirical investigation of the nature of religious objects and the function they perform in the value system of society (x-xi).

Three problems are patent at the outset. In the first place, has instrumentalism succeeded in arriving at naturalism rather than phenomenalism? Second, is a biological theory of logic and mind compatible with metaphysics *überhaupt*? Third, does the instrumentalist not confuse description and explanation? "Evolution" and "emergence" are innocent enough as labels for picturable processes; but when they are identified with causes they are a resort to the mythical logic of pure magic. Instrumentalism, incidentally, has no right to be identified with empiricism. Its "Act" is not a verifiable or observable phenomenon, but rather involves a resort to an unknowable absolute. The personalistic standpoint, that of the concrete, experimental and primordial fact of experience possessed by an experiencer is the only genuine empiricism.

It is too early to estimate accurately the place of Mead in the history of American thought. No

doubt it will be a worthy place, but it is permitted to doubt whether that place will be as high as is claimed by his students. As to this book, its nearly 700 pages remind me of a mine blocked out waiting to be exploited: the gold is there, but one will have to dig with considerable sweat to get any of it.

It is a common complaint that *humanitas* is being submerged in Western civilization under a wave of machine technology, power politics, humanitarian sentimentality, and moral materialism. This view is echoed by the six contributors to the volume *The Meaning of the Humanities*, comprising the Spencer Trask Lectures for 1937-8 at Princeton University. Professor Theodore M. Greene, who writes the introductory essay, complains that

the whole world is drifting or being driven with ever greater acceleration into a state profoundly antagonistic to the values which the human most sincerely cherishes.

Professor Ralph Barton Perry offers "A definition of the Humanities," which are said to embrace "whatever influences conduce to freedom." Freedom, identified with "enlightened choice," concerns "a man's action on circumstances," while "Liberty has to do with the action of circumstances upon the man." Four dehumanizing influences enumerated are technique (tending "to divorce expertness from significance, and thus to trivialize research"), "the multiplication of accessory disciplines, departmental separation, and vocational utility." While any subject may be humanistic, the burden of *humanitas* remains largely with "the humanities *par excel-*

lence, such as history, literature, art and philosophy." August C. Krey, in the second essay, discusses "History and the Humanities." A study of history reveals that the Renaissance was peculiarly humanistic and distinguishable from earlier centuries "not intrinsically, but only measurably." He warns historians against riding fantastic hobby-horses, and suggests that while it is true that history helps preserve the soundness of perspectives, it is equally true that historians must retain the soundness of their own perspective by recognizing the role of the humanities in the biography of man. History, in brief, "must continue to take into account all the ethical and aesthetic as well as material elements involved in any situation."

In a discussion of "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," Erwin Panofsky points out that *humanitas* means at once a value and a limitation, since it is used as the antithesis of both *barbaritas* and *divinitas*. "It is from this ambivalent conception of *humanitas* that humanism was born," and to it is due its two postulates of responsibility and tolerance. A similar dualism emerges in the fact that "The humanist . . . rejects authority. But he respects tradition." Art appreciation is likewise a two-fold process. On the one hand it involves the spontaneous enjoyment of a work of art from the standpoint of the appreciator. On the other it involves a sympathetic understanding of the art object in terms of the artist's intent and experience and in the light of its cultural setting. In the fourth essay on "Theology and the Humanities," Robert Lowry Calhoun concludes that in the

dynamic propensity to defy human orders and to follow what for any reason is believed to be the will of God, the strength and the peril of a live religion appears. This is what makes theology practically significant and dangerous, and the need for humane theology unremitting.

In the concluding chapter on "Literature and the Humanities" Gilbert Chinard points out that while letters offers an opportunity for the indolence of the ivory tower and an excuse for the vices of "intellectual pride, refined selfishness and dilettantism," its service to humanity is irreplaceable. While "Humanism is not easily defined . . . the humanities constitute a definite field of which literature occupies the center." Wilbur Long.

Introduction to the History of Philosophy by Joseph B. Burgess appears to be a successful text for Junior college and lower division classes, and one that the serious public might find enjoyable. The author writes with facility, and has given at least modest attention to the cultural climate of the various periods and the developments in natural science insofar as they have been of influence upon speculative thought. About two-thirds of the volume is devoted to the modern period. A textbook of this kind is faced with an enormous problem of selection. The author, who writes from an extensive background of lower-division teaching, has handled this problem well, and on the whole interprets his material in the light of the best current scholarship. The general treatment ends with the 19th century doctrine of evolution, although two chapters are

added dealing with "Natural rights and social change" and "Some possible implications of recent science." A three-paged reference to Oriental philosophy is admirable in intent, but the writer's lack of familiarity with this field results in grave injustice being done to the speculative achievement of Asia.

Visual Outline of Philosophy by John E. Bentley is a paper covered outline summary of Western philosophy. So far as such a work can be utilized this one will be found useful. Cryptic summaries of doctrine are at best only half-intelligible. To attempt to summarize Neo-Realism in one sentence, for instance, is something that even an angel would scarcely tackle. However, so far as such a work can be, this one will be found useful. Over two-thirds of the contents deal with the modern period. The text, unfortunately, contains some glaring errors both of grammar and historical fact.

This new volume is a continuation and a development of the fourth volume of the *Philosophy of Spirit* entitled *Theory and History of Historiography*. The present work, *History as Thought and as Action*, is not only the culminating point of the Crocian philosophy, but it is also a forceful *apologia* for liberalism and a much needed clarification of its meaning. Together with the important discussions of historical methodology, there is intertwined a polemic against the academic tradition in which philosophy is concerned with major or "supreme" problems, or with what Croce also calls "theologizing philosophy." This polemic is based on the fact that all problems have an historical matrix, they arise in the course of life as correlatives to individual needs.

Furthermore all judgments are historical judgments, *i. e.*, all judgments are in the last analysis judgments of facts, and facts are all in process, they are a becoming.

The volume is composed of seven essays, a conclusion and an appendix, the first serving as the formal introduction to the whole work and providing the title to the book.

Pervading all the essays as theme is the contemporaneity of history, or the relation between historiography and practical activity.

... not exactly to reject the protests which are being made today against "historicism," in the name of an abstract moral absolutism ... ; but because the dialectical process out of which historical thought is born from a struggle of practical passion—transcends it and liberates itself from it in the pure judgment of truth, and by means of this judgment converts this passion into resoluteness of action—is a truly complicated and subtle one. (Preface)

Although as a whole this book is a difficult one, at least two of the essays, those entitled "Historiography and Politics" and "Historiography and Morality" can be read, in our opinion, with great profit by any educated reader. These two essays deal primarily with live issues, with history that is being made; and no one reading them can remain indifferent. For example, Croce defines the "totalitarian" as "not of total and harmonious cooperation, but of comprehensive and total subjugation." Instead of really thinking, people "repeat the words of the catechism, instead of actions they carry out pre-

scriptions." (p. 234) The attacks he makes upon racialism, communist ideology, and clerical absolutism are equally severe. The climax of the whole is the historically reasoned judgment that now is the time for the re-birth of the liberal party and for its vigorous growth, because now, as in post-Napoleonic Europe when the liberal party was first formed, tyranny and oppression are again in power and provide the necessary condition and challenge. Because economic conditions are now changed is no excuse for making man a slave or a sheep in the herd. Liberty is not in principle opposed to government regulation of economic institutions. Here only our experience of economic problems and calculation of utility are competent judges. There is objection to the regimentation and mortification of human personality. Liberalism is defined as a religion, but not that religion which "makes itself transcendent and deprives man of his liberty and conscience and subjects him to a law not coming from his own breast. . . ." (p. 250)

This book is written with passion; but it is a passion always controlled by thought. Important points of epistemology are discussed, particularly in the essay entitled "Certainty and Historical Truth." The purpose of historiography is shown to consist not in a vain copy or imitation of reality, but in an understanding while investigating, it is "to resolve theoretical problems continually arising from the reality of life." (p. 129) Historical judgments are asserted to be non-problematic. For proof of this he refers to the relevant passages in his *Logic*. Epistemologically, this essay is also a vindication of the importance

for philosophy of Giambattista Vico, and of his principle, *verum et factum convertuntur*. But Croce is more radical than Vico and more rational than Hegel. It will be recalled that Vico reserved the knowledge of nature for God alone, because God had made nature. But Croce says,

our proposition does not reserve knowledge of nature either for the gods, or for the only God, and it denies the reality of nature as an entity in so far as it is defined an abstraction and as such a product of the human spirit which so posits it outside of itself and which is itself or an aspect of itself. (p. 266)

And this so-called irrational element in history which proved of embarrassment to Hegel in his *Philosophy of History* is shown to be rational and positive and in the end indispensable once the passage is made from ethico-political history to purely military, economic, natural, or vital history.

The title of this book is easily convertible into an epitome of the whole work: History as thought is historicism; history as action is liberalism. Historicism is variously described as "the logical category *par excellence*," the concrete universal; as "the affirmation that life and reality is history and nothing else but history"; and finally as the true humanism or the truth of humanism. "Historicism is to create one's own action, thought, and poetry moving from the present consciousness of the past." (288)

History as Thought and as Action is one of Croce's greatest works, it reflects his vast erudition, and it is indispensable to

the understanding of a great mind.

This work is to be published in its English form by *Allen & Unwin, Ltd.*

Frederic S. Simoni

At a time when international events seem to blur the rule of Reason in human affairs, this remarkable series of lectures on *Reason* takes a topical significance. But is Reason as perfect and final as popular belief makes it to be? Appropriately Professor Dennes opens up this symposium with an analysis of the so-called "Appeal to Reason" with significant hints at historical events. He shows that it is by the historical study and the philosophical interpretation of the concrete activities and achievements called science, morals, fine arts, and history, that we may learn most about the functions and the promise of reasoning, so that it can scarcely be said that Reason reaches finality in fact. The epistemological angle of this point is developed by Professor Loewenberg in what he calls the "Artifacts of Reason," that is, the meaningful creations of the mind. But all artifacts, whether aesthetic or poetic, presuppose some raw material out of which they are fashioned, and which consists of the objects of common sense. Going beyond this strict realistic position, Professor Loewenberg maintains that the objects of common sense themselves are *artifactual*, and that they owe their status to a spontaneous fusion of acquiescence and transformation. For him, however knowledge is ontological, and the quest for intelligibility is an irrepressible ideal of the human mind. Studying the activity of reason in the development of empirical science, Professor

Lenzen shows the historical growth of our scientific concepts and methods, and comes to the conclusion that the only certain knowledge concerning the applicability of rational schemes in the constitution of science, is presented in the skeptical doctrine of Hume. In his very able discussion of "Definition," Professor Pepper favors the modern views of logic and proposes to characterize the nature of definition with the following statement: "A definition is an expression illustrating the conditions for the application of a rule in accordance with which the meanings of certain symbols expressed are determined." In his paper on "Reason in History," Professor Strong assumes that the life of reason is an embodied progress. But the relativity and plurality of histories cast doubt on the possibilities of rational intercourse between historians of diverse beliefs, and between parties of conflicting purposes. The problem involved in such a view is one of the bounds of scepticism which are tentatively delineated in the concluding parts of this essay. This symposium contains also papers by Dr. Marhenke on "Rationality and Irrationality," by Professor MacKay on "Reason as Custodian," and by Professor Adams on "Reason and Purpose," where many pronouncements and implications have a direct bearing on the present world situation.

Thomas Greenwood.

Science and Equality

BACKGROUND TO MODERN SCIENCE. Edited by *Joseph Needham* and *Walter Paget*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xii, 243. \$2.00.

SPARKS, LIGHTNING, COSMIC RAYS. By *Dayton C. Miller*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. 193. \$2.50.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF SCIENCE. By *Professor J. D. Bernal*, F.R.S. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xvi, 482. \$3.50.

EQUALITY AND THE LAW. By *Louis A. Warsoff*. Liveright Publishing Corporation, New York. Pp. 330. \$3.00.

Background to Modern Science is a symposium of lectures by a group of leading scientists on the Greek backgrounds of modern science followed by an exposition of the advances made in the last forty years. We have here not only a story of progress in the knowledge of atomic structure, a subject of great interest to both layman and scientist, but also an account of progress in physiology, parasitology, evolution, and genetics. The chapters on physics, radio-activity and atomic structure are important because they bring the discovered facts down to the understanding of the man-of-the-street.

F. W. Aston in a chapter on "Forty Years of Atomic Theory" gives an interesting account of researches in the nature of the atom. One of the most valuable parts of his discussion is his clear exposition of isotopism, that strange paradox of isomerism whereby different qualitative substances seemed based on identical chemical formulae. Isotopism now attributes the difference to one of structure within the atom. This theory seems borne out by the experiments in "heavy water" which can now be produced in commercial quantities.

The final chapters on "Forty Years of Evolution Theory" and "Genetics" detail the changes that have come in the doctrine of evolution, show how much of the original hypothesis of Darwin was fleeting or mistaken or misunderstood, and discuss those features that still remain un-

challenged. The author of the essay regards the important matter to be that we have come to regard the world as dynamic rather than static and the chief glory of Darwin was not that he discovered this but that he made men believe in it. Variation is no longer seen as a *creative* force but as selective. Natural selection plays merely the part of a selective agent on heritable variations which have already arisen through an independent process of imitation. Continuity in heritable variation has gone and with it the idea of continuity between species. We are faced once more with the problem of the *origin* of species.

Distinctly a book for the non-technical mind and a worthy addition to the Cambridge Library of Modern Science. R. T. F.

Sparks, Lightning, Cosmic Rays is based on the Christmas Week Lectures given by Dr. Miller for young people at the Franklin Institute in December, 1937. It is what one might call a brief history of electricity and is written in language that is easily understood.

As these lectures were delivered at the Franklin Institute, it is only natural that Franklin should be given an unusually prominent place in the discoveries and inventions that have aided the scientific world in its understandings of electricity. The lack of balance in this respect does not make the book any less readable or interesting, for the remarkable character of Franklin gives the narrative a dramatic character that otherwise might be absent.

It is refreshing to find a man who has such an intimate knowledge of science, as Dr. Miller has, writing a book in a popular and entertaining style upon a

difficult scientific subject. It is also to be regretted that more of our eminent scientists in this country do not imitate this very excellent example. If more efforts were made to popularize science by those who understand it, it would not only be of value in furthering the future progress of science, but it would be exceedingly valuable to the public.

This book can be heartily recommended to those who would like to know about the discoveries and inventions that have made electricity such an important factor in our understanding of the world we live in and also so essential and convenient in our way of living.

L. J. Hopkins.

The political events of today make of this remarkable work, *The Social Function of Science*, a book of the future; for the author is mainly interested in telling us what *science could do* (part II), basing his constructive conclusions on a searching analysis of *what science does* (part I). Though we live in a scientific age, the influence of science on society can be steadily followed throughout history (Ch. II). But it is the organization of scientific research at the present time, which takes the major part of Professor Bernal's interest. A mass of details and references introduces us into the complex structure of the scientific organization of our society, in America, in Europe as well as in Asia. The author criticizes their shortcomings, deficiencies and distorted ideals in the chapters dealing with Science in Education, the Application of Science, International Science, and the ominous subject of Science and War.

A generous ideal breathes

through the proposals which are submitted to us for the scientific organization of a better society. And this ideal involves a philosophy of life which embodies rational principles which many would consider as Utopian in the present time. This is a book which must be read with a pencil in hand, and which must be digested with care. Whatever be one's reactions to Professor Bernal's ideas, one would readily admit that this book provides one with ample food for thought and action.

Thomas Greenwood.

Students of the ethical concept of equality and of the legal interpretation of the Constitution will be interested in *Equality and the Law* by Louis A. Warsoff of Brooklyn College. This volume traces the legal history of the Due Process and Equal protection clauses of the Constitutional Amendments, together with their historical backgrounds in English and American legal history. The text is documented richly with references to judicial decisions. The writer maintains that the two Constitutional clauses have at times been insufficiently distinguished for judicial purposes. The perversion of the fourteenth amendment from its intended protection of negro rights into a great bulwark of property rights is perhaps the most amazing chapter of American legal history. In tracing the legal application of the principles of due process and equality, the author reveals the role of philosophic background in judicial decision.

In concluding paragraphs the view is defended that the Courts should adopt the attitude of presumption of constitutionality with respect to legislation and require freedom from reasonable

doubt before upholding the unconstitutionality of laws:

If there is a possibility of a reasonable difference in opinion there is absolutely no reason, in the Constitution or out of it, for the opinion of the court to prevail over the opinion of the legislature. In the final analysis the legislature presumably enacts the will of the majority of the people whom it represents. In social legislation this is generally true. The court is no better able to determine the necessities of a fact situation than the ordinary intelligent layman. It should restrict itself to facts presented on the record, and should keep unceasingly in mind the fact that behind the statute they are considering is the sincere judgment of a body of men chosen by the people to translate the will of the people into law. Such law should not be upset without the clearest showings that it is not reasonably directed toward a legitimate end (312). W. L.

Medieval Pageant

PRE-REFORMATION ENGLAND. By *H. Maynard Smith*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xiii, 556. \$8.00.

MEDIEVAL PAGEANT. By *John Revell Reinhard*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. Pp. xix, 660. \$4.00.

THE MEDIEVAL LIBRARY. By *James Westfall Thompson*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Pp. viii, 682. \$5.00.

"Not so much a history as the survey of an historical situation" is Canon Smith's *Pre-Reformation England*. In the first part there is a discussion of the condition of pre-Reformation England, in the latter part an accounting for the tendencies of

the time. Here we have an exact and verified account of the state of the English church, its strength, its relation to the Papacy, the practice of absentee clergy and pluralities, the salaries, stipends, and fees; clerical morals and worldliness and their relations to the courts. The popular religion is set forth, the superstitions and abuses, the rapidly changing economic, social, and political conditions.

All this is supplied as the basic grounding for the events about to take place. The causes of Lollardy are discussed, the influence of the English mystics, the rise of popular literature, the coming of humanism and the Catholic Reformers. To this is added a summary of the causes of the Reformation and the changes it brought about, together with an extended bibliography.

Scarcely any principle of human society has been more thoroughly tested or more convincingly shown than the incapacity of individuals or institutions to survive the gift of unquestioned and irresponsible power. Authority, supreme and unquestioned, has ever been the "Old-Man-of-the-Sea" that has burdened society through the centuries. Sometimes this authoritarianism is social, sometimes political, sometimes religious, but always bad. Perhaps it has never been so unsavory as when it has been exercised in the name of religion. Always when power, authority, or even desirable social standing has fallen to the gift of the church, unscrupulous and irreligious men have disgraced her by selfish and low-grade politics. The unquestioning obedience of the multitude, their fear of social and physical consequences of revolt, were possibly more deterring than even the fear of Hell.

As always in such a situation, those in possession of special privilege would not give over without a struggle. Yet the times were ripe for change. The invention of printing and the growth of popular literature which came in the wake, the economic upset that followed the discovery of America and the bullion ships of Spain, the conflict of ideas that attended the Humanistic Renaissance: no *status quo* could eventually withstand the clamor for change. Out of this ferment modern Europe came into being. Ours may be the melancholy privilege of witnessing the upset of those achievements which were then won at such a cost. Will European civilization re-adjust itself in this crisis or will it perish? These are questions every thinking man is asking at present. This book with its trustworthy information about the rise of the present epoch bears suggestion and wisdom for our times to those who read with understanding.

Canon Smith has done the cause of sound learning a real service.

The idea is at least as old as Chaucer but the setting is modern for John Revell Reinhard's *Medieval Pageant*. He gives in a single volume the great tales of the Middle Ages, tales that were carried from mouth to mouth when the only magazine was the talk at the fountain, the joust, the fair and the banquet. Here again we hear them as if from the lips of the great raconteurs, Jean de Meung, Boccaccio, Froissart, Giraldus Cambrensis, Hector Boëce, Gog Magog, Marco Polo, Ponce de Leon, Chretien de Troyes, William of Wykeham, Master Stace, Monk Eustace, The Clerk of Oxenford, Walter

Map, Roger of Hovenden, Sordello, John Skelton and a host of others. Here are more than six hundred and fifty pages filled with the story of farm and market, of boudoir and camp, ballad and fairy tale. All are most cleverly strung together in conversational form, like some conference on the Styx in modern style, with many a quip and turn of speech which does credit to the literary taste and skill of the author.

The work is rare in the diversity of tale which it brings together in a single volume, it is valuable to the student of things Medieval because it gives a more than usually accurate picture of life in the Middle Ages, and for the average reader it offers a source of amusement. A book that can be read successfully in odd moments, beautifully printed and illustrated.

With the breakdown of confidence in a pure modernism there has been a significant revival of interest in things medieval. The last five years have witnessed a plethora of books respecting the philosophy, ideals, history, and culture of the Middle Ages. Many of these have been strongly written and we no longer can feel cocksure about dismissing with a grimace that culture which was so largely the basis of modern achievement.

One of the most important of books on medievalism and dealing with it from a new and valuable standpoint is James Westfall Thompson's *The Medieval Library*. The quality and extent of its libraries is likely to be the measure of any culture and the story of the building up of monastic, cathedral, university, and private libraries is the story of the rise of culture in the medieval world. There is much in

this history to give us pause for the appearance of dictators, national and tribal uprisings, political and religious wars has almost without exception meant the destruction of libraries and the at least partial disappearance of civilization. The same old forces are still in operation as anyone may see who has stood in Shanghai before the ruins of that Chinese library so ruthlessly shelled by the Japanese in 1932. Here the oldest existing manuscripts and most precious in the world were inexcusably destroyed. That times and temper have not changed is indicated by the similar destruction of the old national library in Nanking in the wanton plunder of that city. Wherever a rampant militarism goes it asserts this character of hostility toward the cultural.

In *The Medieval Library* we have the distressing story of such destruction. On the other hand we witness the effort that was put forth to save the ancient literature of Greece and Rome. This forms a thrilling history in itself and cultivates a new respect for good books.

Another strange phase of history which is brought out is the incredible wandering of books and manuscripts. Every owner of a library has become at times painfully conscious of the difficulty attending the return of a book. First, if it is at all diverting one keeps it too long, then is ashamed to return it, finally one procrastinates and is lost, or more strictly the book is lost to its rightful owner who has forgotten to whom it was loaned or who hesitates violently to retake it. 'Twas ever thus, and even more so with the Medieval Library for copies had to be borrowed that more copies might be made. Scarcely a single library

existed that was not in some such manner plundered. Out of this grew the system of initial deposits, catalogues and rules which have been inherited by the modern library.

One cannot but wonder if due to the present confusion in Europe the great libraries there may not be destroyed, leaving only such collections as have taken refuge in America to carry on the continuity of culture.

The story of the library is told in engaging phrase and interesting form by Professor Thompson such as will intrigue the less academic. At the same time it will prove invaluable to the librarian and the other collector of books. For the historian it presents a new approach which gives an often overlooked phase of medieval history. The format and printing are of unusual beauty.

R. T. F.

Forceful Biography

MEN OF POWER. Volumes III and IV. By *Fred Eastman*. The Cokesbury Press, Nashville, Tennessee. Pp. 200. \$1.50.

THE LIVING THOUGHTS LIBRARY. Volume I. SCHOPENHAUER. By *Thomas Mann*. Pp. 160. Volume 2, THOREAU. By *Theodore Dreiser*. Pp. 162. Volume 3, MONTAIGNE. By *André Gide*. Pp. 162. Volume 4, TOLSTOI. By *Stefan Zweig*. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. Pp. 154. \$1.00 each.

No literature possesses an interest equal to well-written biography. No type of reading is of greater value for the young. In the series *Men of Power*, Fred Eastman meets the need for brief well-written biographies of great leaders of human thought and activity. Volume Three treats of Franklin, Emerson, Darwin, and George Fox. These subjects are handled with skill and with literary excellence. The

author shows a detailed knowledge of the lives of those he writes about and brings forward the high points of character and events.

Volume Four presents biographies of Lincoln, Tolstoy, Burroughs, and Graham Taylor.

To those who have read the longer lives they are refreshing in special emphases and the calling to mind of half-forgotten facts. To those who have not read in biography they may well form a fascinating doorway into more extended reading. They are good books to own and good to present to young readers.

We find quite different treatment of biography in *The Living Thoughts Library Series*. Here we have the lives of men presented through the medium of their most significant ideas. The list of editors for the series insures this being done in the most outstanding manner. To be convinced of this needs only to discover that Thomas Mann writes of Schopenhauer, Theodore Dreiser of Thoreau, André Gide of Montaigne, and Stefan Zweig of Tolstoi. It would be difficult to improve this list among our modern writers either for the appropriateness of each to the subject under discussion or for the assurance of literary excellence in the matter written.

The plan for each volume is first of all a critical essay showing the significance of the ideas of the subject for his own and for modern thought. There is in this connection a brief summation. Then follow excerpts from the writings skilfully arranged to present the leading concepts.

In the *Schopenhauer* biography Thomas Mann writes a most illuminative sketch showing the relation of Schopenhauer to his forerunners, Plato, Kant,

Hegel, and Buddha and pointing out his influence on Nietzsche, Wagner, Freud and Plitzner. He chooses *The World as Will and Idea* as the epitome of Schopenhauer's real work of which all else written during his seventy-two years is but the accompaniment and reinforcement. Schopenhauer, he holds, stands nearest to us than to either the classicists or romanticists of his own day because he was essentially modern. He has been much berated for his pessimism but this, as the author shows, had its qualifications.

It is precisely in the pessimistic hue of his philosophy that his humanity and spirituality lie; in the fact that this great artist, practiced in suffering and wielding the prose of a great humane cultural epoch in our history, lifts man out of the biological sphere of nature, makes his own feeling and understanding soul the theatre where the will meets its reverse, and sees in the human being the savior of all creation (29).

Thus it is that the author feels Schopenhauer to be a voice of expression for the modern age:

Everyone realizes that when this great writer and and commanding spirit speaks of the suffering of the world, he speaks of yours and mine; all of us feel what amounts almost to triumph at being thus avenged by the heroic word.

One of the most remarkable resurgences to public interest in modern times is promised in the new interest which is being shown for the work of Henry Thoreau. It reminds one of the hundred years more or less in which the work of Spinoza lay

dormant until a new generation should be able to re-evaluate and give new expression of appreciation to the work of the great monist. We have now a revival of interest in Thoreau, which would have astonished all Concord and perhaps Thoreau most of all. Theodore Dreiser has written a scintillating appraisal of Thoreau in this second volume of *The Living Thoughts Library Series*, and backs it up with an unusually fine selection of Thoreau's writings which will make many question how they could so long have remained indifferent to them.

To Concord he seemed more than a wee bit "off" because of his non-conformist attitude toward their habituated ways and thoughts. Now his position may be better seen as the independence of a man determined to live his own life free from the meaningless and cramping artificialities of his time. There is in his work enough of philosophical and moral insight, of downright wisdom, to make him outshine all of his Boston and Concord contemporaries and Mr. Dreiser has skilfully given us sufficient excerpts from the Thoreauan writings to be convincing.

The place of Montaigne in the history of human thought is an important one which is understood but vaguely by the common man. It is well to have so skilful a critic as André Gide provide us with an analysis of Montaigne's work, his sources and his influence in bringing to birth that liberalism that ushered in a new day in European letters. What inquires Gidé:

Did he bring the world then that was so new? Self-knowledge — and all other knowledge seemed to him uncertain; but the human

being he discovers—and uncovers — is so genuine, so true, that in him every reader of the *Essays* recognizes himself (3).

He thought he knew nothing truly but himself but in knowing and disclosing himself he became the voice of a new movement in human history. The author sets before us the best and most interesting selections from the famous *Essays*.

The most difficult of comprehension of all these leaders is perhaps the one whose work is set before us by Stefan Zweig in *Tolstoi*. This strange modern had run the gamut of human emotions. Moved by a conversion as powerful as that of Socrates but untempered with the Socratic practicality Tolstoi moved in a world in which he had no real part. His efforts after the simple life and toward social leveling were misunderstood and scorned not only by his family and by the privileged classes but by the peasants themselves. He came down to death disturbed of soul and only half-certain of himself. His all or nothing philosophy had separated him from all he held dear except his own integrity and he found himself at last in an arctic mental clime as forbidding as that which Ibsen pictured for his hero, *Brand*.

The perusal of the quotations from his works gives the secret of this result. They show that uncompromising idealism incapable of true self-criticism which isolated the great soul of Tolstoi from his world. This is a compromising, uncompleted world and he who refuses the best he can get is likely to find himself empty-handed.

These volumes are of unusual interest and will serve to lead be-

ginner to new appreciations and wider readings. R. T. F.

Religion, Christianity and Honesty

SOCIAL RELIGION. By *Douglas Clyde Macintosh*. Chas. Scribners Sons, New York, 1939. Pp. 326. \$3.00.

CONSCIOUSNESS CREATIVE. By *Francis J. Mott*. A. A. Beauchamp, Boston. Pp. xii, 395.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE CREATIVE QUESTS. By *Gaius Atkins*. Cokesbury Press, Nashville. Pp. 232. \$2.00.

CHRISTIANITY AND MORALS. By *Edward Westermarck*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xiii, 427. \$5.00.

THE EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD IN LATE BRITISH THOUGHT. By *Peter Anthony Bertocci*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Pp. xv, 311. \$3.50.

HONESTY. By *Richard C. Cabot*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. ix, 326. \$2.50.

TYPES OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. By *Edwin A. Burt*. Harper Brothers, New York. Pp. ix, 512. \$3.00.

In the first part of this excellent study, *Social Religion*, the author gives an exposition of the principles of social religion as represented in the New Testament. He argues that what is set forth in the Sermon on the Mount is an eternally valid ideal for social relations.

In the second part, problems of Social Religion are discussed under the headings—the prevention of war, the abolition of poverty, the safeguarding of liberty, and the reformation of government.

Problems coming under The Prevention of War, are pacifism, outlawry of war, collective security, preparedness, disarmament, economic factors in war and peace, world government, national sovereignty, and isolation and neutrality. These are discussed with clarity and with constant reference to and quo-

tation from pertinent literature. While some of what the author has to say is outmoded by the outbreak of the European war, it gives a heightened significance to other parts, such as for example the pertinent question—

Why should unselfish love to neighbor be right between individuals and wrong between nations? May it not be true of the nations that if they seek at all cost to save their sovereignty they will lose it in the end, and if they are willing to lose some of their sovereignty for the sake of peace . . . they will in the end be able to keep all the sovereignty they will need for the solution of such problems as are of merely international concern? (pp. 179-80)

The chapter on The Abolition of Poverty discusses the causes and proposed cures of poverty, in which is included an unbiased although sympathetic report of the activities of the "New Deal" in this direction, and outlines the steps which must be taken toward the socialization of the economic order.

The discussion of The Safeguarding of Liberty is enlivened by a personal note as the author gives an account of his own experience in being denied citizenship in the United States because of his unwillingness to give an unequivocal "yes" to the question "If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country"? This chapter also contains excellent summaries of the status of freedom in Russia, Germany and Italy.

The final chapter on The Reformation of Government points to the ineffectiveness of third parties in the United States to achieve reform, and advocates a political

strategy for reformers which the author at first put forward in 1932. This strategy would be to acquire large enough lists of voters to hold the balance of power between two major parties, bringing to bear upon them pressure to elect progressive candidates and adopt progressive platforms.

Herbert L. Searles.

The objectives of *Consciousness Creative* by Francis J. Mott may be stated under a twofold purpose. Negatively to reveal "the hidden error which underlies the present tragic world situation" (viii) by a recognition of laws which govern "the universal process of integration" (viii); and positively, setting forth "a new religion and philosophy" (viii) which demands action. The method employed is esoteric: the best that science can do is to array a succession of still photographs, but Occultism comprehends the unity of the succession; "that which Science treats symbolically, Occultism claims to enter into with intuition and clairvoyant perception" (143). Moreover the doorway into Occultism is the "spiritualistic circle."

For we realize that in the spiritualistic circle we have a definite example of an integrated entity created by the coming together of an aggregation of human beings around a central focus.

The volume is well published and, presumably, for people seeking instruction in the vagaries of spiritualism, they would find this book stimulating and satisfying.

Paul R. Helsel.

Christianity and the Creative Quest presents the Cole Lectures at Vanderbilt University for 1938. Each lecture deals with a significant quest of man for the mean-

ing of life. Through the Hebrew prophetic literature is traced the search for the will of God in history. Socrates is taken as the pattern for the philosophic quest for truth in Greece. The Stoics, and especially Marcus Aurelius, represent the quest for moral integrity, where salvation is found in the citadel of the soul. The quest for deliverance is illustrated in the monastic orders which practiced separation from the world, and the mystic in the "flight from the alone to the Alone." The quest for authority is exemplified in St. Augustine who set up the authority of the church as the guardian of salvation. Two final chapters call attention to the diversity of the quest within western civilization and within protestantism, and call for a social order in which spiritual values may be reestablished.

As a whole the spirit of the lectures is challenging to thought and action; not over optimistic not yet filled with disillusionment but reflecting a deep understanding of great world literatures and the problems facing contemporary Christianity.

H. L. S.

"While Jesus was a moralist, Paul was in the first place a theologian" (397), "Moral judgments being ultimately based upon emotions" (411), and

Whatever else Paul's conception of faith may imply, it presupposes in the first place the intellectual acceptance of some fact as true; and such a belief cannot be a proper object of moral judgment (397),

may be selected as key statements by which Professor Westermarck divorces Jesus and Paul in *Christianity and Morals*. Historical Christianity exemplifies

the sharpest diversity between the two with respect to the central purpose of Jesus having to do with the moral nature of men. Let us see how this has come about.

According to the author, moral concepts are based on emotions:

I have thus arrived at the conclusion that the attempts of philosophers and theologians to prove the objective validity of moral judgments give us no right to accept such validity as a fact. I am now prepared to take a step further and assert that it cannot exist. The reason for this is that in my opinion the predicates of all moral judgments, all moral concepts, are ultimately based on emotions, and that, as is very commonly admitted, no objectivity can come from an emotion (33).

Also this relation between moral concepts and emotions applies to the work of Jesus.

I maintain that this thesis is nowhere confirmed more strongly than in the teaching of Jesus as recorded in the three synoptic gospels (40).

Paul's experience, on the other hand, gave him a wholly different understanding of Christianity. While Jesus was subjective, Paul was objective. "Faith in Jesus Christ is the keystone of Paul's whole teaching" (104), but this faith pertained not to an inner event but to an outward fact.

Whatever else Paul's conception of faith may imply, such as trust, "enthusiastic adhesion," and obedience, it presupposes in the first place the acceptance of some fact as true; and such a belief cannot be a proper object of

moral judgment (115-16).

"Are we to conclude then that the teaching of Paul is devoid of all ethical significance. By no means" (118). "To an ecstatic convert like Paul faith may seem a sufficient source of love and anything it carries with it" (122). But Paul was a mystic, and "ordinary men are not mystics; and ecstatic converts are dangerous founders of religious creeds" (122). It is upon this ground, therefore, that the author concludes that:

From the moral point of view, there is positive danger in a doctrine that relies upon love of fellow-men and good deeds as the fruits of faith . . . in an established religion the faith of the ordinary believer may fail entirely to produce similar effects (122).

Such a view lays the foundation for orthodoxy and has "brought the Christian religion into conflict with the nature of moral emotions and ideas" (122). Since "there would have been no Paul without Christ, and there would have been no Christianity without Paul" (394), the reason becomes apparent why Christianity has taken one direction—objective, factual, faith, theological, authoritarian, whereas Jesus would have had it take another direction—subjective, partaking of motive, moral, love and service.

The subject matter of the volume is divided into two parts. The first ten chapters, after making clear essential presuppositions, studies "Christian ethics as expressed in theories of salvation" (214) and examines "how far these theories are in agreement with the nature of our moral emotions" (214). Most of the major doctrines of the Church down to the Reformation

period are surveyed by citing a wealth of evidence from the Church leaders from the time of Clement of Rome to Calvin. The remaining portion of the book is "devoted to a discussion of the influence which Christianity has exercised in concrete cases upon ideas and behavior within different branches of morality" (214).

The principle subjects mentioned are war, exposing newborn infants, feticide, the use of contraceptives, homicide, suicide, wealth, charity, trade, fair price, interest, capitalism, slavery, lying, persecution, science, marriage, divorce, irregular sex relations, and regard for lower animals. Comment cannot be made on all of these topics, but a few quotations may indicate the trend of the author's thought. "Christianity had entered on the war-path already before it came into contact with Mohammedanism" (218). "Calvin . . . led to the religious sanction of capitalism" (272). "The teachings of Jesus can certainly not be recognized as applicable to economics" (277).

The gradual disappearance of slavery in Europe during the latter period of the Middle Ages has commonly been in the main attributed to the influence of the Church. But this opinion is scarcely supported by facts (289-90).

and

"pious frauds," those innumerable falsifications of documents, inventions of legends, and forgeries of every description, which made the church a veritable seat of lying, and most seriously impaired the sense of truth in the minds of Christians (308).

This volume illustrates how

false assumptions may be postulated and then supported by taking part of historical data to justify the assumptions. The reviewer believes that shortcomings of Christianity are of the nature of accidents, and do not inhere in the structural nature of Christianity as advocated by Paul. The old issue of Paul vs. Jesus has been answered repeatedly. On the other hand, this is a stimulating book even for Christian readers. It provokes reflection and re-examination. Moreover, the author's grasp of material is enormous and is appreciated.

P. R. H.

Peter Anthony Bertocci's *The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought*, is the culmination one might expect of nearly three centuries of empirical thought inaugurated by John Locke. Conceived primarily in the interest of science, it was inevitable that in time Empiricism would find general application and invade even the field of religion.

"This work is an essay in empirical philosophical theology" (xi). "The empirical argument for God, then, is . . . that the most reasonable interpretation of presumptive knowledge drawn from the various realms of human experience leads to belief in God" (3). In the words of Tennant's *Philosophical Theology*:

We must begin with experience, since otherwise, there is no problem; and return to experience, since otherwise no solution is made good; and proceed on the analogy of experience, since otherwise there is failure of that continuity and resemblance in which explanation consists (4).

The arguments of five recent British thinkers are examined:

James Martineau, Andrew Pringle-Pattison, James Ward, William R. Sorley and Frederick Tennant. There follows a closing section by the author. Although the variety of subject matter in the respective works examined necessitated differences of treatment, a single method pervades them all: first a positive statement of the thinker's views, particularly of God, then second, the author's criticism of the views and pointing out of the weaknesses of the arguments. Finally, at the conclusion of the treatment of each philosopher a summary of the arguments and criticisms is outlined under separate headings. These summaries both refresh the memory and clarify the understanding by brief and precise putting of the thought in definitive form.

"There is a conflict of the empirical and the apriori in Martineau's thought" (42). The roots of Martineau's argument for God lie in the nature of conscience. But when man inspects his conscience he finds two minds present in it: his own and a superior one, the ground and authority of which is God. Here the empirical is transformed into the transcendent. Pringle-Pattison begins with empiricism:

We do not argue . . . from bare idea of a systematic whole, but from the amount of system and the *kind of system* which we are able to point to as realized in experience. From that we argue to *more* of the same kind . . . although it may be on an ampler and diviner scale. (*Idea of God*, 230.)

But, by the time Pringle-Pattison arrives at his conclusions, there slip into his argument a "prior conviction of an existent unity which . . . therefore guar-

antees the truth of their ideas" (64).

The author believes that Ward's "theistic monadism" reveals more consistency than the systems of Martineau or Pringle-Pattison.

It is only at the very end of his argument that this empiricism falters unconsciously, led astray perhaps by the strong imperative of moral experience. He is least empirical as he argues for the objectivity of values (132).

Sorley's moral argument for God is based upon a reversal of the scientific approach. The scientist would proceed from the "is" to the "ought," but Sorley claims that the latter cannot be derived from the former. Professor Bertocci, of course, disagrees and contrasts Sorley's view with his own.

for him [Sorley] primary value-judgments claim validity and the Good is known inductively by the coherent systematization of "oughts." For us, value-claims assert validity, and the Good is inductively known by the coherent systematization of desires (156).

"In the work of Tennant we have found the most faithful adherence to [empirical] procedure and the soundest use of data available" (256). His works "tower above the other works we have studied" (252). This, however, is done at the cost of any "direct acquaintance with God" (227):

Religious experience . . . is constituted "religious" and *sui generis* by being interpreted in terms of the idea of God . . . by idealization, from ordinary knowl-

edge of the world and man (254).

Moreover, the author embraces Tennant's notion of a limited God. At considerable length, he argues for limitation after the general pattern of Professor Brightman's "Given." Although Professor Bertocci mildly commends the "what" of the "Given" as presented by Brightman, he unqualifiedly accepts its form. These are his words:

That there is a limit to God's power which he does not impose on himself seems clear . . . what the limitation is must be a matter of reasonable speculation (275).

This excellent volume merits the attention of philosophers and theologians. The fullest understanding and appreciation of it would require considerable acquaintance with the works examined, yet without this, since the author has chosen such pertinent quotations and has displayed such unusual ability of summary and epitomizing, very much may be gained, although one may not be well acquainted with the writings of the five British philosophers. P. R. H.

A multitude of readers will welcome this final work of Dr. Cabot with mingled feelings of joy in the work and sorrow that his facile pen and creative spirit are no longer with us.

When the final estimates are made respecting the useful figures of our age the name of Richard Cabot must receive a high award, for here is a writer on ethics with a sufficiently popular appeal to be effective in the popular mind.

Honesty is a dynamic book for an age which blurs ethical distinctions, which suffers from war neuroses and theories of violence. It is heart-searching in its

profundity and crystal clear in its exposition. Is a "white lie" ever justifiable? Dr. Cabot in his long medical practice did not find it so. He would be the first to admit that there are different ways of telling the truth, and that one must at times do much sifting before arriving at it, but believes that even for the peace and the welfare of the patient a basis of truth is desirable. His best illustration is the case of one of his patients to whom it became necessary to reveal the fact that she was suffering from mental derangement and should go to an asylum. Her rejoinder to the announcement of her insanity was "Oh! is that all?" She had become conscious of changed attitudes toward her which had troubled her. She feared herself suspected of something much worse than insanity.

The principal disaster attending prevarication he holds to be the effect upon the prevaricator. In the attempt to deceive others he principally deceives himself turning his life over to the domination of a lie, a pretense, a false perspective which leads him farther and farther away from his true self. One lie calls for another to sustain the illusion. Life becomes more and more narrowed, creative power is destroyed and the liar becomes the increasing victim of his own falsehoods.

The first section deals with definitions, veracity vs. infallibility, feints and fictions, reserve, frankness, privacy, secrecy, self-deceit, prevarication, equivocation and evasion. In the second section he presents selected problems of honesty and dishonesty in war and crime, government, industry, science, education, medicine, social work, art, polite exchanges, and religion. The final

section presents a philosophy of honesty. Toward the end of this section he gives us what might well, for every one of us, be taken as the fulfilment of life and religion:

Hard pressed by the burden of existence in sorrow, disgrace or failure, it occurs to a man now and then that he is impotent because he is trying to run the universe. Then he may try the experiment of letting Reality act through him, which is what the Bible means by casting our burden on the Lord. . . . We recall Lincoln's address more clearly than the battle itself because Lincoln voiced a superhuman response latent in the occasion. Power was generated in the expression of his impotence. In great decision, great music, or great discovery, the actor seems passive and the universe speaks at his evocation. This backing of Reality liars forego. "Change" is more apt to trip than to forward them. The honest man "shares the life by which things exist" and finds their backing in unexpected places. Most of us are not honest enough to win this support many times in our lives. My best example of welcome support from Reality was the cry of relief of my poor old friend when I told her that she was insane: "Oh! is that all?" We slander the facts when we speak of such aid as "good luck," or even as "special Providence." The spiritual constitution of reality which is round us and in us perpetually, is called to our aid by our intense and unaffrighted effort. "We lie in

the lap of an immense intelligence which makes us receivers of its truth and organs of its activity," *provided we have done our part.*

R. T. F.

Types of Religious Philosophy merits favorable consideration. Its production arises out of something more than academic interest; the author confesses that he is trying to supply for others what he lacked when he "first began to struggle seriously with the problems of religious thought" (vii).

Avoiding evangelism as far as I could, I have tried to contribute toward a fundamental clarification of religious philosophy. This is what I once desperately needed; there must be others that feel that need today (vii).

Inasmuch as Professor Burt aims at an "objective understanding of religion" (1), he feels limited to three forms of understanding: history of religion, psychology of religion and philosophy of religion. However justifiable the objective point of view may be, a believer in religion feels that the omission of the fact of experience in a consideration of religion resembles a beautiful but uninhabited house.

The plan of the book is commendable. Chapter II surveys early historical backgrounds of definite types of religious expression. It covers a great sweep, beginning with the early Hebrews and closes with the early Christian centuries and the formation of doctrine. Then follows an account of seven types of religious philosophy: Catholic, Protestant, the Religion of Science, Agnosticism (Empiricism), Ethical Idealism, Modernism,

Humanism. Under the Catholic type, the author presents a clear outline of the principle contributions of St. Thomas. I think that it must be said that the chapter on Protestantism is the poorest of them all. Although Calvinism does bulk large in Protestant thought, my severest criticism on the book is the branding of Protestantism as Fundamentalism. An uninformed individual reading this section would receive a distorted picture of historic Protestantism. In fact, to add another critical note that applies generally, it is the opinion of the reviewer that the religious aspect of the volume is weaker than it should be. The philosophic material is excellent. For instance, the discussion of Spinoza's thought, its background and elucidation is as good as found anywhere. Also the exposition of the difficulties connected with Kant's system are transparent and persuasive. Professor Burt explains Kant's answer to the question, "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible" (246), to my satisfaction, better than any other brief statement I have read.

On the whole the volume merits careful examination. Even those who have no formal training in philosophy, may go through it by applying thought and diligence. Inasmuch as philosophy furnishes basic patterns of thought taken over by religion to relate its experiences, some knowledge of that background is positively necessary for the larger and more valid comprehension of the religious phenomenon itself. This volume will contribute much to such an end. P. R. H.

Great Personalities

IN THE SPIRIT OF WILLIAM JAMES.
By *Ralph Barton Perry*. Yale Uni-

versity Press, New Haven. Pp. xii, 211. \$2.00.

BERNHARD VON CLAIRVAUX. *Zur Typologie des mittelalterlichen Menschen*. By *Olavi Castrén*. Gleerupska Universitetsbokhandeln, Lund. Pp. 382.

VON HUGEL AND TYRRELL *The Story of a Friendship*. By *M. D. Petre*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. Pp. xiv. 203. \$1.85.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY WITH LETTERS. By *William Lyon Phelps*. Oxford University Press, New York. Pp. xxiii, 986. \$3.75.

If William James, by any trick of fortune, should come to occupy the place in American philosophic tradition that Pascal holds in France, it would undoubtedly be due more than anything else to the brilliant and indefatigable loyalty of Ralph Barton Perry, whose studies on his teacher and master have become classics in American letters and biography. *In the Spirit of William James*, the latest of his works of historical interpretations, comprises the second series of Powell lectures on philosophy at Indiana University. The most significant and original study of the volume is the first chapter, in which a comparison and contrast is made of the background and thought of James and Royce. The two men, it is pointed out, swapped standpoints of their respective early environments.

Royce, the more American in his experience, is the more European in his philosophy; while James the more European in his experience, is the more American in his philosophy. . . .

Royce spent his early years in a region where people used their senses, learned by experience, and labored with their hands; his philosophy was rationalistic and *a priori*. James, born and bred among ideas, was

the arch-empiricist, turning in his philosophy toward experience and practice. It was James's and not Royce's conclusion, that "there is no conclusion"! . . . To apply James's own expressions, it was Royce who in philosophy was the "tender-foot Bostonian," though he originated even west of the Rocky Mountains; while James himself, who frequented Boston, Newport, and the capitals of Europe, was the philosophical "Rocky Mountain tough."

With his usual deftness of analysis, the author in subsequent chapters discusses James's empirical theory of knowledge, the metaphysics of experience, militant liberalism, and the right to believe. Pragmatism is a thorny nest of ambiguities; but at the hand of Professor Perry the confusions are dissipated. A clear distinction is made between James's radical empiricism (doctrine of immediacy), his pragmatism (theory of meaning and proof), and his fideism or faith philosophy. The elements in James's thought that are to be distinguished from positivism, instrumentalism and operationalism are elucidated. James's view, we are told, is more aesthetic and metaphysical in character than are these left-wing pragmatisms. His thought lays more emphasis upon "intuitive expectation" than upon experimental hypothesis, and considers acquaintance as a type of knowing.

I cannot help but feel that Professor Perry stacks the cards when he discusses James's voluntarism. The author would see in James's teleological epistemology merely his famous "right to believe" doctrine, according

to which a man is granted permission to have "faith" if he so chooses when there is no evidence for or against what he desires to believe. As thus interpreted James is an orthodox intellectualist, an old fashioned evidentialist, a believer in the exclusive authenticity and prerogative of impersonal, objective, neutral evidence. How then are we to explain James's utterances concerning the ontological rights of the total personality and his sanctioning of the criterion of a man's "total response?" In brief, Perry would place James with the sheep and Schiller with the goats, when Schiller, at least, always insisted that James was in fundamental agreement with his humanism.

The peculiar character of the title of this volume from Professor Perry's pen is no doubt due to his inclusion of the later chapters of certain developments and applications of James's moral and political views in light of the contemporary situation. We can only refer to one. What shall be liberalism's attitude toward the rights of illiberalism? Must liberalism defend itself by becoming illiberal and refusing the right of an illiberal opposition to be heard? No, it is replied, for this spells the doom of liberalism. In defending itself by dictatorial means it commits suicide. Liberalism must grant a free voice to every viewpoint, and must refuse to consider any ideas, institutions and documents as sacred. "There is no such thing as sacredness in a liberal society, if by sacredness is meant immunity from criticism."

W. L.

Bernhard von Clairvaux is a Swedish doctoral dissertation written and published in German. It is based on a compre-

hensive and penetrating study of the works and sermons of Bernard, extensive extracts from which are quoted in the footnotes in their original Latin wording while a German translation is incorporated into the text. This translation is usually correct. (Indeed, only two faults have struck this reviewer. On p. 68 Bernard is credited with the heretical view that matter had already been created when God created heaven and earth. But Bernard says something very different: when God created man, He animated the clay of his body by imparting to it His spirit, the clay itself having already been created previously, *viz.*, when God created heaven and earth. And on p. 157 Bernard is quoted as saying that a light-minded man is always eyeing his superiors with suspicion, whereas the text says that he is always looking up to his superiors and down on his inferiors.) There are some misprints in the text as well as in the footnotes. Particular emphasis is laid on Bernard's quotations from Scripture; these are listed in a separate index covering more than fifty pages. It need hardly be said that Barnard mostly interpreted these passages allegorically thus being free to read anything he held to be appropriate into the text.

Bernard of Clairvaux was one of the dominating figures of the twelfth century. He was not a philosopher: neither a speculative thinker like Anselm, nor a dialectician like Abelard. Nor was his ingenuity wasted on the idle task of stuffing the tenets of the Christian faith into the formulas of Aristotelean philosophy. He aimed neither at demonstrating their truth nor at defending them against attacks

of unbelievers. His thoughts moved freely within a dogmatic system, long since worked out on all essential points and which to him appeared entirely rational and consistent. But even these thoughts were to him but of secondary importance. He was above all a pastor of souls and a great preacher, well read in the inspiring works of Augustine and expressing religious fervor with poetic force and pungent oratorical power. What has attracted and surprised the reviewer most is Bernard's practical wisdom and his insight into the hearts of men. His description of monastic types may well be compared to Theophrastus' "Characters" (p. 153-58). There is the man who always finds excuses for what he is accused of: he has not done it; or if he has, there was no harm; or if there was, the damage was not great; or if it was, it was not intended. There is the monk who accuses himself of enormous crimes which nobody can believe, for the purpose of discrediting his confession of what he has really done. There is the talkative monk who delights in frivolous chatting; when his stories are interrupted by divine service, he feels unhappy and the service seems intolerably long. There is the ambitious monk who wants to eat less and to look paler than his brethren; he is not interested in common worship, but loves to prostrate himself alone in the chapel, attracting attention unto himself by coughing. And there is the inquisitive monk who cannot concentrate on his prayer-book, but is secretly gazing around for some interesting detail.

Unfortunately, the author is not really interested in all this. He gives it an indifferent glance

and passes on, buttoning his clerical garb. His aims are much more pretentious. He stands for a new method of historical research, discovered by another Swedish theologian, Anders Nygren, and strenuously advocated by Mr. Castrén. It is termed "Critical Investigation of Fundamental Themes," or trends, and claims to be "science for science's sake" (p. 52). It is, however, a queer sort of science. As applied to Bernard it investigates the "Christian validity" of his pronouncements. At the goal of its somewhat circuitous track it will turn out to be a new name for a very old thing, *viz.*, for the cry of No Popery!

Mr. Castrén, following Mr. Nygren, starts with the assumption that the spiritual life of the Christian era is a synthesis of three fundamental trends: the Hebrew trend, centered round the ideas of Law and Judgment; the "Platonic" or "Neo-Platonic" trend, holding out enduring bliss in a better world as the reward of successful suppression of carnal appetites; and the concept of *agape*, or unselfish love, as embodied in the New Testament. The "Critical Investigator" has to determine the proportion in which these three trends are represented in the particular "synthesis" of any given phenomenon. In the present work the analysis is applied to Bernard and the result is that "his" synthesis contains but the Hebrew and the Greek trend, but has "nothing in common" with the Evangelical trend: Bernard, strictly speaking, was not a Christian.

This surprising verdict is mainly based on the fact that Bernard in stressing the commandment of charity seldom fails to emphasize that only by

obeying this commandment we may hope to attain eternal bliss. Hence, the author argues, Bernard's charity is not an overflow of spontaneous love, it is a means toward an end different from itself; it is "teleological," as Mr. Castrén expresses himself, and thus has "nothing to do" with the unselfish *agape* that is the central idea of the New Testament. By presenting charity as a condition of happiness, Bernard follows the Platonic tradition; by defining this condition as obedience to a law he pays homage to the Old Testament; but the spirit of the New Testament forms no part of "his synthesis."

As is usually the case, these contentions do not altogether lack a grain of truth, but to this reviewer the grain appears unusually small. Bernard's century was in its way thoroughly rationalistic. People wanted to find out why things were as they were supposed to be. Anselm had claimed to have found out "Why God had become man" and Bernard also felt obliged to tell his audience why they should love their fellows. As the most obvious reason he pointed out that by so doing they would be likely to enter paradise whereas otherwise they would very probably go to hell—which does not at all imply that he himself had heaven or hell in mind every time he assisted or advised or forgave a fellow-man.

The position branded by the author as un-evangelical is by him always referred to as "Bernard's synthesis." But was it really Bernard's, *i. e.*, was he in this respect at all original? Mr. Castrén surprisingly argues that he need not concern himself with Bernard's sources nor compare him with his contemporaries (pp. 38, 53). But in truth the

three trends hardly needed a new synthesis at the time. Bernard was confronted with a solid block of tradition into which those trends had long since been incorporated. Indeed, it appears to this reviewer that their synthesis is as old as the New Testament itself. Or can it be denied that the gospels have very much to say about Latter Day Judgment and that they hold out to the believer the prospect of a new life on a new earth? By ignoring these patent facts the author's position becomes particularly untenable where he discusses Bernard's interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount. Even here, he says, love, for Bernard, simply means concupiscence, longing for happiness (p. 209). But in truth it is the text itself which gives these "teleological" motivations: "Blessed are they who are poor in spirit, *for* the kingdom of God is theirs; blessed are they who suffer, *for* they shall be comforted; blessed are they whose heart is pure, *for* they shall see God," etc. Hence, the "Platonic" trend is there, though the author may prefer not to see it.

In other respects also his attitude would seem to be very unfair and even inquisitorial. For Bernard the life to come is the all-important thing. Thence he quite rationally and consistently concludes that the best thing one man can do for another is to induce him not to jeopardize his own salvation. But he wisely adds that this must be done with discretion and circumspection: admonitions should be neither too harsh nor too mild and should not be undertaken by one whose warnings might be answered with the words: "Do not bother about the splinter in my eye as long as you have not re-

moved the beam from your own." On this the author comments by remarking that Bernard has introduced a "gliding scale" of charity and that according to him charity is based on self-love (pp. 216, 322). In touching words Bernard explains (p. 131 ff.) that there is no greater beatitude on earth than to meditate upon the concealed meaning of the Scriptures and to enter into the closest communion with God, but that nevertheless in actual life the duties of charity are more urgent: How often must we not lay aside the Sacred book, if a brother should need our assistance or our advice; how often must we not even forego Holy Mass for the purpose of dealing with some urgent secular affair! This Mr. Castrén construes (pp. 221, 324 ff.) as implying that for Bernard charity was a burdensome duty, that he was sorry to have to love his brethren and looked forward to a future state in which he would not have to worry any more about their affairs. In a sermon, Bernard says that although according to Isaiah's prophecy Christ was outwardly inconspicuous, yet inwardly He was of transcendent beauty. This savors of Platonism and a severe frown appears on the author's forehead (p. 295). Finally, summing up his harangue, Mr. Castrén remarks (p. 307) that according to Bernard God does not really love the sinner; he loves but the sinner's soul which, just as stained gold nevertheless remains gold, remains God's image even when sullied by sin, so that, after all, God loves but what is like Him. It is quite understandable that, on account of such "hellenizing" views, a candidate in a Lutheran seminary might be graded "F"; but it is much less

understandable why Bernard of Clairvaux should be dealt with as if he were such a candidate, almost eight hundred years after his death. Heinrich Gomperz.

Von Hugel and Tyrrell is a volume of letters compiled and published for the purpose of correcting the mistaken notion that the friendship of von Hugel and Tyrrell "was a misfortune to the latter" (8). These two men were warm friends, but with the rise of the Modernist movement divergencies between their thinking relative to ecclesiastical authority were inevitable. "Von Hugel's measures were diplomatic and Tyrrell's were, when he saw no other way, militant" (8), nevertheless they remained friends to the end.

The author was a friend of both and speaking of her own qualifications to deal with this subject says:

Because, as I may say without boasting, I am the living person who now knows most of those relations, and [am publishing these letters] because I want to leave a true history behind me of a somewhat tragic friendship (4).

The letters contain the interest that usually accompanies the personal correspondence of notable men, and also cast some light on historical fact not otherwise known.

P. R. H.

A half century of teaching would in any case produce much of interesting episode and relationship if well told. When the teacher is William Lyon Phelps, episode, relationship, and language combine to make an unusual narrative. Phelps has long held an enviable position in American university life through his writing and lecturing as well as through his contacts with

thousands of students as one of the most popular teachers in one of our largest universities. In his *Autobiography With Letters* he tells the story of his childhood and youth with a keen sense of humor bringing out many a serio-comic situation, as when a small boy, with his first gun and bent on bird hunting, he shot Mark Twain's ducks which he supposed to be wild. He was able to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of this "outrage" though Mr. Clemens in wrath put a price upon his head by advertizing in the local paper. He never dared in later life to disclose himself to the humorist fearing the latter might not be able after years to see the joke.

We have here the panorama of American college life, the literary activities and personalities of educators, writers, actors, and singers who at various times visited Boston and New York, Harvard and Yale and many of them as Professor Phelps' own guests. All these he met with a cosmopolitan spirit, a sympathetic mind and sense of humor which makes every page of the autobiography interesting reading.

Any generation may be said to be transitional but the period of Phelps' life witnessed more rapid changes in academic outlook, more drastic changes in curricula, than in the previous century or two. The author was himself one of the "liberators," for with much trepidation on the part of his colleagues he was allowed to introduce the first course in any American, and probably in any academic institution anywhere, on the contemporary novel. This seemed at the time not only unusual but daring and even subversive of scholarship.

Professor Phelps was reared in a ministerial and very pious family which gave him the advantage of convictions, seriousness, intelligence, and character. These qualities though much overlooked in the present day, and often deprecated as narrowing and leading to bigotry, are still the most substantial foundations for useful and successful living. He did not repudiate the pietism of his home by the declaration that defection from religion and church were due to too much of these influences on his early life. Whenever we hear such a statement made we feel like challenging it. There was nothing of the kind here. He naturally grew to more liberal views and retained all his affection for things religious and respect for the convictions of his parents to whom he owed so much.

His interest in contemporary literature was the means of introducing a host of students into appreciation of modern literature, as for instance in the case of Browning, but it further acted as a tie to bring a close acquaintanceship with the most outstanding literary lights of his day. His private reactions given in his account of these personalities make the book of exceeding importance. Over all and through all shines the illumination of a great man and a great teacher which go to make this one of the most valuable books of the year.

R. T. F.

Counseling and Guidance

THE ART OF COUNSELING: How to Gain and Give Mental Health. By Rollo May. The Cokesbury Press, Nashville, Tennessee. Pp. 247. \$2.00.

ONE GENERATION AND ANOTHER. By Robert Russell Wicks. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. Pp. viii, 191. \$1.50.

In *The Art of Counseling* Dean May gives us the outcome of valuable experience and intensive study in the relief of unfortunate complexes and psychoses as he has met them principally among young college students. The advice he gives is invaluable to all those who find themselves in a position of authority or of mentorship over others. He tells something of the art of character interpretation from the dress, bearing and habits of the person advised and shows the various steps in the restoration of confidence and of normal human relations. In a world and a moment teeming with psychiatrists and psycho-analysts of all sorts the author presents an unusually sane and tenable program for the recovery of mental health. His work is not cluttered up with technical terms but can be easily understood by parents and guardians and others without technical psychological training. At the same time the advice given is in line with the best and most up-to-date information in psychology.

One Generation and Another is primarily a book for parents, prospective parents and contemplators of matrimony. The author rightly holds that the most formative influence in the child's life is the example of love, justice, equity and the atmosphere in the home created by the parents. This unconscious training he places far above all rules of rote and formal exhortations. It is an eloquent and forceful plea for a new exaltation of home-life and the power of the family tradition. It is a book to be called to the attention of all homemakers, present or prospective.

R. T. F.

Value and Fact

THE PLACE OF VALUE IN A WORLD OF FACTS. By *Wolfgang Köhler*. Liveright Publishing Company, New York. Pp. ix, 418. \$3.75.

Professor Köhler's *The Place of Value in a World of Facts* finds that place to be of very great importance indeed. For values are not only themselves a sort of fact, but they may control facts, oppose them and organize them. Indeed it appears to be value, or something very like it, that holds the world together. Mere facts, as the opening chapter contends, have too long been the only interest of science. Science, at least physical science, has tried to put facts on the one side, man and his values on the other, and then give all its attention to the former. But the separation is false, and has resulted not only in the neglect of human values by science, but in the impoverishment of science itself. "Man," as Professor Köhler asserts, "does not come from another world; he is himself a child of nature, of that very nature which the physicists investigate. When we compare his characteristics with those of nature we must, therefore, expect to find resemblances." This book is a search for those resemblances, especially for the resemblances to the human habit of valuation, and for the possible generic trait of which human valuation is one species.

Professor Köhler finds that generic trait in what he calls "requiredness." As a term, requiredness is somewhat unfortunate, for it immediately suggests necessity and cause, and cause is one of the things that Professor Köhler definitely does not mean by requiredness. Requiredness is more akin to

"fitness," or "direction," or that other unhappy term "oughtness." Requiredness issues, vector-fashion, from some location, and goes, in its own way, somewhere else. In this procedure its own nature demands a fitness. This may be illustrated by a very simple example: a curve begins as a curve, and its nature then demands, but does not cause, that it continue as such. If the degree of curvature changes suddenly, we are confronted with something that immediately impresses us as "wrong." If it proceeds in its own way, we feel that it is "right." This sort of requiredness will also be recognized in our feelings of formal balance, color harmony, and the like.

As far as the human observer is concerned, requiredness may travel in several ways: It may issue from the self and proceed towards objects, the familiar path of the so-called subjective desires; it may issue in objects and proceed towards the self, as in the demands that things seem to make upon us; and it may issue in objects and remain in them, as in the example just quoted. It may even, and this is most important, transcend the phenomenological world. This is indicated for one thing by memory, and for another, and even more clearly, by forgetting. If, for example, we have forgotten a familiar name and are "searching our minds" for it, the name we are seeking is plainly not a present phenomenon. Yet from its place beyond immediate consciousness it exerts such a feeling of requiredness upon us that we can accept no other name.

But if requiredness is not merely phenomenological, neither is it merely naturalistic. For by a further concept called "isomorphism," Professor Köhler

finds that the same sort of dualism that is found in mental life, may also exist between facts and selective tendencies in nature. To be sure, this is not proved, but it may be demonstrated as possible. "No procedure of science," says Dr. Köhler, "reveals any actual participation of demands and values in the determination of organic events. At the same time science can clearly demonstrate that in certain systems function will for dynamic reasons, take a most "fitting" course. We do not discover requiredness as such among the data of science. But a general trend of nature is

sometimes found to yield the same results as might be expected if the events in question were actually happening in order to fulfill a demand."

Professor Köhler's book closes on the threshold of human value itself, but the directions that the ensuing value theory would take are fairly well indicated. Probably too many value theories have worked only in the other direction. They have begun with human values and looked for a place to put them. Dr. Köhler's method, and his impressive book itself, are likely to be more fruitful. W. Vincent Evans.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Books not commented on here will be reviewed in future numbers.

- AMERICA IN MID PASSAGE. By *Charles A. Beard* and *Mary R. Beard*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. 977. \$3.50.
- CHATEAUBRIAND: A Biography. By *Joan Evans*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xiii, 380. \$4.00.
- CHRISTIANITY AND MORALS. By *Edward Westermarck*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xiii, 427. \$5.00.
Reviewed in this issue.
- CATHOLICS AND UNBELIEVERS IN 18TH CENTURY FRANCE. By *Robert R. Palmer*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. Pp. 236. \$4.00.
- THE CHURCH AND THE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF OUR DAY. By *Karl Barth*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. Pp. 87. \$1.00
- THE CAVALCADE OF THE SUPERNATURAL. By *Harold H. V. Cross*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. Pp. 259. \$2.00.
- CUP OF STARS: Verse. By *Jean Chalmers Donaldson*. Banner Press, Atlanta. Pp. 62. \$1.50.
- D. H. LAWRENCE AND SUSAN HIS COW. By *William York Tindall*. Columbia University Press, New York. Pp. xiv, 231. \$2.75.
- THE DREAM WORLD. By *R. L. Megroz*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. Pp. xiv, 319. \$2.50.
- THE DRAMA OF OUR RELIGION. By *A. Graham Baldwin*. Oxford University Press, New York. Pp. x, 253. \$1.80.
- EVOLUTION OF AMERICA'S SOCIAL INTENTION. By *Burdette B. Brown*. The Times-Mirror Press, Los Angeles. Pp. 31.
- THE EVANGEL OF A NEW WORLD. By *Albert Edward Day*. Cokesbury Press, Nashville. Pp. 160. \$1.50.
- ÉTUDES PHILOSOPHIQUES: Tome III—Annales d'Ecole des Hautes Etudes de Gand. By Mm. *Gaston Bachelard, Eugene Dupreel, Rene Le Seune, Louis Lavelle, Gabriel Marcel, Vladimir Jankelevitch, Marcel Decorte, Yves Simon, Etienne Borne*. Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Gand, Belgique. Pp. 251.
- FREEDOM AND CULTURE. By *John Dewey*. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. Pp. 176. \$2.00.
- FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS: The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen 1935-36. By *Sir W. David Ross*. Oxford University Press, New York. Pp. xvi, 329. \$5.00.
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- WHO WAS SOCRATES? By *Alan D. Winspear* and *Tom Silverberg*. The Cordon Company, New York. Pp. 96. \$1.25.

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	<i>The Greeks Bear Gifts</i> Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture: <i>Jaeger</i> ; Translated from the Second German Edition by <i>Higbet</i> . The Greek Tradition: <i>Boas</i> .	
	<i>An Outstanding Work</i> History of Ancient Civilization: Volume I, the Ancient Near East and Greece. Volume II, the Roman World: <i>Trever</i> .	
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OUR CONTRIBUTORS' PAGE

The fertile pen of the **Editor** brings us in this issue a portrayal of *The Need and the Illusion of Absolutes* demanded by man for the solution and rationalization of his paradoxes. The truth is that science, the one discipline which has professed so long to be free from paradoxes, has at last been affected also by the "principal of uncertainty."

Philosophical Personality is a worthy and timely defense of the study of philosophy and the development of the philosophic mind. For insight into what philosophy attempts and into the type of solution it would afford, **Professor Gustav E. Mueller**, of the University of Oklahoma, here makes a contribution.

Eighteenth century religious thought is revived for us by **Nancy Moore** of the Department of English, Butler University, Indianapolis, under the title *Deism and Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. It deals with the leading spirits of that movement as well as with Coleridge.

E. Parl Welch, Professor at St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, contributes *Edmund Husserl—An Appreciation*. Dr. Welch's study with Husserl gave him an enviable opportunity to understand Phenomenology.

Dr. Paul R. Helsel reviews a Platonic principle with modern implications under the title *Imitation, Selfhood and Personality*. Professor Helsel is a member of the philosophy staff at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles.

Readers of this quarterly have come to appreciate the writings by **M. Whitcomb Hess**. *A Note on the Appeal of Music* maintains the same high character of former articles. Mrs. Hess' husband is at the University of Ohio.

The Significance of Whitehead's Philosophy for Psychology is presented by **Pearl Louis Weber** of the Municipal University of Omaha, Nebraska. Psychology will reach its goal only as it studies all organic experience and behavior from the germ of consciousness to the triumph of judgment.